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ABSTRACT
This thesis documents the narratives of a group of Egyptian youth about their participation in the 18
days of protest and analyzes their narratives in terms of reasons and meanings of taking part in such
events. First, I analyze how these youth constructed their memory of the 18 days and produced a
certain version of history. Second, I look at the meanings they ascribed to the Revolution through
examining their narratives about why and how they participated in the 18 days and how such an
experience changed their perception about and their desire for participating in collective action and
politics in general. Analytically, I examine the making of political subjects through the unfolding of
an event, i.e. the Revolution. I argue that the making of political subjectivity through participation
in the events identified as the Revolution is equally shaped by sensibilities of belonging to a
collective articulated in patriotic terms. In sum, I aim to contribute to the production of histories
about the Revolution from the perspective of its participants, as well as to analyze the meanings of
belonging, the nation, citizenship, and subjectivity that emerge from experiences of protest and the
constitution of narratives thereof. I contend that it is not only the events themselves and the
experiences thereof that shape political subjectivity, but equally important is the production of
historical narratives thereof.
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Chapter One
I-Introduction
As the protests unfolded in Tahrir Square last year, Egyptians seemingly suddenly, or
perhaps gradually, abandoned their disinterest in collective action and let go of their fear by joining
mass protests that were--in their scale and timing--unthinkable, both to the regime and the
participants themselves. For the first time, at least since the 1952 Revolution, thousands of hundreds
and even at times, millions of people were on the streets marching or camping out to demand the
removal of the ruling regime at the helm of which was then President Hosni Mubarak. For many if
not most of them, this was the first time that they have ever ventured into the public space to call for
any of their civil, political or social rights alongside their fellow citizens from different religious
affiliations, economic classes, regional backgrounds, and political ideologies. These series of
protests and the sit-in, now commonly referred to as the Revolution, succeeded at least in the
dismantling of the regime’s facade, including the president, after which power was passed on to the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) until the presidential elections in May and June,
2012 that brought the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, into power. The debate
about what these changes in the political and historical structure mean is still ongoing as is a core
movement that is still seeking to overhaul the system from its roots in line with the revolutionary
rather than the reformist model of change. According to this group of activists and protest
organizers, the Revolution1 is still continuing until its goals, which in themselves still fail to win
consensus, are achieved.
However, amongst the mess and uncertainty about the meaning and the outcome of the
Revolution, a clear-cut transformation has taken place: many more Egyptians now--after the ouster
of Mubarak on February 11, 2011--have become much more willing to take part in social and
political collective action and are more interested in the affairs of their country. They gained a new
1

The mass protests that broke out on January 25 and led to the ouster of Mubarak have been called by the media,
government officials, and political commentators “uprising,” “revolution,” and “revolt” among other terms. I will use
the term “Revolution” to refer to these events as I discuss in the section on terminology at the end of this chapter.
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sense of ownership of their territory and their destiny by virtue of their actual or even symbolic
participation in overthrowing a ruler who was in power for 30 years. Even though, this unthinkable
event happened thanks to a myriad of factors--including but not limited to the regime’s delayed
reactions and stubbornness and international pressure--it nevertheless helped boost Egyptians’ selfconfidence, at least for a while after Mubarak left. The Revolution, as an extraordinary historical
moment, also triggered heightened patriotic sentiments, or simply “the love of the country,” a
sensibility that reversed for the majority of Egyptians a feeling of frustration with their country.
This research is an attempt to make sense of that change as a rupture and as a process that is still
evolving and the meanings emerging therefrom. This research looks at a group of middle-class
youth, who for the first time in their lives took part in mass protests, and how they narrate their
experiences.
II- Goals
The aim of this thesis is two-fold: to document the narratives of a group of Egyptian youth
about their participation in the 18 days of protest and to analyze the narratives in terms of the
reasons for and the meanings attributed to taking part in such events. First, I analyze how these
youth construct their memory of the 18 days and produce a certain version of history. Second, I
look at the meanings they ascribe to the Revolution by examining their narratives about why and
how they participated in the 18 days and how such an experience changed their perception about
and their desire for taking part in collective action and politics in general. Analytically, my aim is to
examine the making of political subjects through the unfolding of an event, i.e. the Revolution. I
further argue that the making of political subjectivity through participation in the events identified
as the Revolution is equally shaped by sensibilities of belonging to a collective articulated in
patriotic terms. In sum, this thesis aims to contribute to the production of histories about the
Revolution from the perspective of its participants, as well as to analyze the meanings of belonging,
the nation, citizenship, and subjectivity that emerge from experiences of protest and the constitution
of narratives thereof. I contend that it is not only the events themselves and the experiences thereof
10

that shape political subjectivity, but equally important is the production of historical narratives
thereof.
III- Questions
My research addresses two overlapping sets of questions pertaining to the histories of the 18
days of protest and meanings of belonging, citizenship, nation, and subjectivity:
A. Histories of the 18 days of Protest:
1-What is the chronology of events that marks participants’ narration of the 18 days of
protest and how do they differ among participants?
2-What are the reasons cited by the participants for taking part in the protests and
what did participation in the protests mean for them?
3- What are the modes of engagement in the protests and what factors determined
the activities the participants carried out during the protests (e.g. the role of a
physician would be different from the role of an activist or that of a
journalist, or someone supplying medicine and

food, sleeping in the

square, etc.)?
4- Do participants acknowledge increased involvement in collective social and political
action because of and/or after participating in the 18 days? If so, what does that increased
involvement entail?
5- How does the narration of the events identified as the Revolution shape participants’
political subjectivity?
B. Belonging to the Collective:
1- What are the terms of belonging participants used to narrate the 18 days of protest? What
kinds of collectives and communities did they imagine belonging to, how, and why?
2- What role do the participant’s subject position play in defining their experiences of
11

protest and their imagining of collective belonging in the context of protest; and how do
these experiences compare with other experiences before and after the 18 days?
3- How can the display of flags and the chanting of patriotic slogans and songs that
permeated the protests be explained? Did nationalism or patriotism--or more precisely the
claim of “love for one’s country”--and the desire to acquire citizenship rights play a role in
mobilizing participants and in shaping their experience of protest? How were these ideas
manifested during and/or transformed by such an experience? For participants who
highlighted the importance of “love for the country” or citizenship rights in shaping their
experience, in what ways did they perform these and how were these similar to or different
from the period preceding their participation in the protest?
4- How did the participants’ increased involvement in collective political and social action
and their ideas about citizenship rights and about patriotism shape their subjectivity?
IV-Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
Most academic studies (Korany and El-Mahdi 2012, Bayat 2011, Bamyeh 2011, Amar
2011, Amin 2011) on the January 25 Revolution had two characteristics in common: First, they
analyzed events from the etic view that gives primacy to the perspective of the observers rather than
the view of the participants; and second, they were more concerned with questions related to how
and why the protests took place than with questions about meanings of such events to participants.
There is not sufficient in-depth academic material given that less than two years have elapsed since
the outbreak of the Revolution and the time of writing. However, there many articles that were
written as the protests were ongoing, and they do provide the building blocks for further analysis
that I hope this thesis will contribute to (Bayat 2011, Amar 2011).
In articles written shortly after the eruption of the protests, Paul Amar and Assef Bayat
highlighted the civil character of the protests. “It is neither nationalist, anti-imperialist, nor thirdworldist”, argued Bayat (Bayat, Feb. 10, 2011). Paul Amar referred to the emergence of a “new
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political society” in Egypt uniting new or relatively new groups of youth, workers, women and
religious groups (Amar, Feb. 1, 2011). He argued that the uprising’s successful take-off was due to
the coming together of two forces: the movement of workers’ rights, especially in the two years
preceding the Revolution, and the movement against torture and police brutality that mobilized
people across the country in the three years preceding it (Amar, Feb. 8, 2011). Omnia El Shakry
offered a historical structural view of the January 25 Revolution by comparing it to the revolutions
of 1919 and 1952, and concluding that it is the “product of unprecedented historical assemblage of
complex forces” (El Shakry 2011). Samir Amin examined the link between the Egyptian
Revolution and the global financial crisis of 2008. He posed the question whether the recent of
wave of protests, which he saw as mainly directed against the imperialist character of the regimes,
would be able to lead to the transition to a “loftier pattern of civilization, that of Socialism” (Amin,
2011, 7-8). Taking a wider pan-regional historical-structural perspective, Bahgat Korany and Rabab
El-Mahdi argued that the roots of Egypt’s Revolution was in domestic and regional political
activism that date back to the Palestinian Intifada. They argued that the actors involved in the
Revolution and the mobilization tools that they used were much more diverse than current accounts
made them to be. Worker and peasant protests, pro-democracy movements and sit-ins as well as the
“erosion of the corporatist social pact that sustained authoritarianism” all contributed to triggering
the Egyptian Revolution. As such, the authors sought to dispel what they called the main “myths”
about the Egyptian Revolution: that it was sudden and unexpected, that social media was the main
mobilizing tool behind it, and that it was a revolution driven by middle-class youth (Korany and ElMahdi, 2012, 14).
The previous sources have in common two things: the type of data they relied on for
analysis and the perspective they took to analyze them. Their data was collected through
observation, media articles (as in Jeffrey C. Alexander’s “Performative Revolution in Egypt”), and
historical archives rather than through interviewing or direct interaction with the participants of the
Revolution, and most of them take an etic perspective that was mostly concerned with structural
13

issues. So these kind of sources are suitable for the kind of questions they pose. However, to answer
a different set of questions--those about meanings and processes related to the Revolution--, one has
to deal with a smaller scope and take a different unit of analysis: that of the subject (Ghannam 2012,
Abu-Lughod 2012, Winegar 2012).
Ghannam examined the impact of the events in Tahrir Square on the thoughts and feelings
of Egyptians in a low-income Cairo neighborhood and attempted to explore some of the cultural
meanings, such as the use of violence, that shaped her close interlocutors’ attempts to make sense of
the shifting situation during the early days of the Egyptian Revolution (Ghannam, 2012, 32). Lila
Abu-Lughod offered insight into how the Revolution was experienced in an Egyptian village in
Upper Egypt, where youth mobilized to find solutions to their community’s problems (AbuLughod, 2012, 21). Jessica Winegar challenged the assumption that political transformation during
Egypt’s Revolution was solely shaped by the iconic male revolutionaries in Tahrir Square.
Although these men by virtue of being on the square did have a privilege, the women she
interviewed at their homes also experienced Revolution through various forms of affect that were
influenced by their gender and class (Winegar, 2012, 67). Thus, all of these articles take the subject
as the locus of their studies, trying to go beyond answering questions about why and how the
Egyptian Revolution happened, to more of a focus on the meanings of the events from the
viewpoint of their participants. My study aims to add to that literature. My concern is with
questions that are smaller in scope, rather than trying to look at the protests in aggregate. I will do
this by taking the individual subject as the focus of the thesis.
A- “Politics from Below”
Korany and El-Mahdi proposed two approaches that are relevant to the understanding of the
January 25 protests: Social movement theory and the theory of everyday resistance (Korany and ElMahdi, 2012, 10). Hank Johnston defined social movements as being made up of several
organizations and less formal groups and circles in addition to individuals with no affiliations who
are gathered around an issue or a certain grievance, which they publicize and illustrate their force to
14

state representatives with the aim of bringing about change (Johnston, 2011, 14). Mario Diani
argued that the diverse groups taking part in the movement should put their differences aside so that
they could form a united front against their opponents and that the social movement’s duration
“extends beyond an isolated action or the lifespan of a specific group” (Johnston, 2011, 14).
However, three concepts from social movements theory are most useful in understanding the
Egyptian and Arab Spring context, argued Korany and El-Mahdi. First, resource mobilization
explains how political, financial and cultural resources are mobilized for the purpose of dissent.
Second, political opportunity structure as a paradigm seeks to explain why people take part in
contention and why their numbers multiply at certain points in time. Finally, framing explains how
individual subjectivity evolves into a “shared inter-subjectivity, and thereby to transform dispersed,
disgruntled individuals into an organized protest movement, with shared objectives and even a
shared identity” (Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012, 10-12).
Korany and El-Mahdi also proposed the theory of everyday resistance that was presented by
James Scott and afterwards developed into what Assef Bayat called “the quiet encroachment”
(Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012, 10). Central to this approach is the idea of “politics from below.”
They argued that misconceptions by many political scientists studying the region are attributed to
an overemphasis on ‘politics of the elite’ 2 (Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012, 14). They argued that the
way knowledge about the region is produced by area specialists is deficient in that it gives ultimate
importance to ‘politics from above’3, ‘formal politics’ and “institutional politics” to the detriment of
‘politics from below’, ‘informal politics’ and “extra-institutional dynamics”. This study of “politics
from above” is justified by the fact this region’s political rulers are “over-present” and
“domineering”, however, it does not provide the full picture as it is “incomplete and biased”. This
bias is even more apparent when one embarks on the study of change that is spearheaded by
“excluded and marginalized sectors, as is the case in the Arab Spring” (Korany and El-Mahdi,
2012, 8). I will follow Korany, El-Mahdi and Bayat in emphasizing “politics from below” rather
2
3

The parenthesis is the authors’.
The parenthesis is the authors’.
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than “elite politics” that take rulers as their unit of analysis. I will focus on the subjects of the
January 25 Revolution, the protesters.
Asef Bayat’s theoretical lens of “street politics” and “the quiet encroachment of the
ordinary” (Bayat, 1997& 2009), is relevant to this thesis in that it goes beyond the “public
dimension of elite politics” and focuses instead on the “politics of the informals” (Bayat, xii-xv,
1997). Bayat argued that “ordinary people” gradually reclaim their rights from the state by
encroaching on the very space from which it seeks to exclude them, becoming politicized into
action that involves joining larger networks of activism when their gains are threatened (Bayat
2009). He speaks of “atomized individuals” who engage in collective action and “operate outside
formal institutions of factories, schools and associations” (Bayat, 2009, 9). “[S]ocial agents without
institutions, coherent ideology, or evident leadership” are at the heart of this kind of politics (Bayat,
2009, 15). For urban subjects, who are the locus of my study and “who structurally lack institutional
power of disruption (such as going on strike), ‘the street’ becomes the ultimate arena to
communicate discontent” whereby conflict between these individuals and the authorities erupt as a
result of the “active use” of public space” (Bayat, 2009, 11). Street politics “assumes more
relevance, particularly in the neoliberal city, those shaped by the logic of the market”, including
Cairo (Bayat, 12, 2009), which is the site of my study. This offers a framework to understand how
“atomized” Egyptian youth were mobilized to join the mass protests (mainly because of the lack of
opportunities to practice politics or collective action within the framework of formal institutions,
which were autocratic, exclusive, and dominated by elites).
Bayat also proposed the term “social nonmovements” to refer to “collective actions of
noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose
fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely
guided by an ideology or recognizable leadership and organizations” (Bayat, 2009, 14). Bayat’s unit
of analysis is the “poor and disenfranchised” (Bayat, 1997, xvi), although he does expand this in his
later work to include women and youth (Bayat 2009). This fits my thesis because I will focus on
16

Egyptian youth who were not “activists 4” or “active” before the outbreak of the Revolution and who
have become mobilized into collective action and later joined political parties and other social and
political change groups or organizations after taking part in the January 25 protests and sit-ins. This
thesis is about how the action of “ordinary” people for whom protest and collective action was not
part of their lives until the onset of the Revolution brought about change. Also a reference to
Thomas Hardt and Antonio Negri’s idea of “multitude” as presented by Bayat is important.
Multitude is defined as “singularities of social subjects that act in common” (Bayat, 2009, 21).
Bayat drew the distinction between both concepts: while the concept of non-movements refers to
people from the same group, such as Muslim women, globalized youth, urban poor or illegal
migrants, multitude brings together social subjects belonging to different groups, such as men,
women, black, white, etc. (Bayat, 2009, 21). What is relevant from these two concepts of nonmovements and multitude is this: the idea of the “ordinary” unaffiliated people effecting change and
that these people do not necessarily belong to one class or one group. And this is exactly the case at
hand here: unaffiliated youth joining forces with different groups in Egyptian society to effect
change. And these ordinary actors, the youth, had their subjectivities shaped by the historical event
of the Revolution and by their participation in it.
B- Theorizing the Subject of Revolution
The perspective I take in this research is that of the acting subject, i.e. the protester, whose
subjectivity is shaped by his or her narration of the Revolution and his or her involvement in
effecting political and social change during and after the 18 days through participation in the
protests, joining political parties, voting, and so on. In order to understand the formation and
transformation of the subject during and after the Revolution, I will rely on three theorists: Michel
Foucault, Sherry Ortner, and Ranabir Samaddar.
Foucault’s objective was to create a history of the different modes by which human beings
are constructed as subjects by bringing in the question of power. One of the ways he suggested
4

Nashet is a word used in the Egyptian context to refer to individuals who are part of loosely organized groups.
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power should be studied is through the examination of forms of resistance against various forms of
power in a way that brings to light the power relations that permeate society. Foucault conceived of
power not as an institution or a dominant group but as forms or techniques exerted through
practices of everyday life that turn individuals into subjects. This technique of power acts upon the
individual in that it “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to
his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize
in him” (Foucault, 2000, 331). Foucault means subject in the dual sense of the word: “subject to
someone else by control and dependence”, and as “tied to his own identity by a conscience of selfknowledge” (Foucault, 2000, 326-331). Therefore, power only exists in so far as it is exercised by
one party, whether individual or collective, over another, although it also exists as a set of available
possibilities that are supported by permanent structures. “What defines a relationship of power is
that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon
their actions: an action upon an action, on a possible or actual future or present actions” (Foucault,
2000, 340).
Foucault’s theory is useful in explaining youth subjectivities that were formed under
Mubarak especially with regards to the everyday practices of state agents vis-a-vis its citizens.
These subjectivities were reformulated and reshaped as a result of participating in the Revolution.
Salwa Ismail showed in her study of popular quarters how Egyptian youth evolve as subjects of
humiliation. She explains that the everyday encounters of Egyptians, in particular youth, with
government agents and agencies give rise to understandings and feelings that result in their
formation and development as subjects of ihana and mahana, which means a sense of humiliation
or a feeling of being humiliated. These youth see this humiliation as undermining their selfidentification as awlad el balad (sons of the country), a subjectivity resulting from their being able
to act freely. Against this backdrop, emerges a subject that is opposed to the government, and it is
this subject that was the agent of the January 25 Revolution (Ismail, 2011, 990-992). Ismail, here,
tied the psychological formation of the subject, i.e. through humiliation, to the larger structure
18

within which the subject exists, i.e. the state. Ortner further developed this tie between the
psychological and structural levels by expounding on the concept of subjectivity.
Ortner dissected the concept of subjectivity into two levels between which she keeps
moving back and forth: the psychological aspect that deals with the inner feelings, desires, anxieties
and intentions of the person, and the wider social and cultural formations that shape and stimulate
subjectivities. In this sense, subjectivities are reflections of the inner state of the acting subjects that
are shaped within specific cultural and historical structures. In her exact words, it is “the ensemble
of modes of perception, affect, thought, desire, and fear that animate acting subjects” as well as the
“cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and provoke those modes of affect, thought,
and so on” (Ortner, 2006, 107). This subjectivity is the basis of “agency”, which is indispensable in
understanding how people attempt to “act upon the world even as they are acted upon... it takes
shape as specific desires and intentions within a matrix of subjectivity--of (culturally constituted)
feelings, thoughts, and meanings” (Ortner, 2006, 107-111). “[T]he idea of agency itself presupposes
a complex subjectivity behind it, in which a subject partially internalizes and partially reflects
upon... a set of circumstances” in which he or she finds himself or herself (Ortner, 2006, 126-127).
Ortner built her view on the basic assumption of practice theory that postulates “that culture
(in a very broad sense) constructs people as particular kinds of social actors, but social actors,
through their living, on-the-ground, variable practices, reproduce or transform--and usually some of
each--the culture that made them” (Ortner, 2006, 129). Ortner highlighted the importance of what
she calls “social practices” of actors and its dialectical relationship, rather an oppositional
relationship, with the structural constraints on human beings (Ortner, 2006, 4). Practice theory
provides an understanding of “the production of social subjects through practice in the world, and
of the production of the world itself through practice” (Ortner, 2006, 16). Foucault and Ortner,
thus, both stressed the importance of “practice” in shaping subjectivities, with the former focusing
more on on the power exerted through certain form of practices itself or what he calls “techniques”
and the latter emphasizing the social actors themselves. But the main point here is that subjectivities
19

are shaped by real practices grounded in the social world through a process that involves self
awareness and reflexivity, and that very same process in itself is capable of reshaping the larger
structures. Practice, process and reflexivity are thus central to subject formation.
In an attempt to understand subjectivities that emerge under conditions of the practice of
“politics” and/or being engaged in a “political” process, I find Ranabir Samaddar’s concept of the
“political subject” useful. It is useful in this thesis because it takes its unit of analysis to be the actor
who becomes engaged in politics out of necessity without being part of formal or institutional
politics yet operates within its framework (Samaddar 2009). This, I contend, is the case of youth
who took part in the January 25 Revolution and who continued to remain engaged in social and
political action, also out of necessity and not as a luxury. Samaddar examined the conditions under
which such figure emerges, arguing that it is contentious everyday events that do not necessarily
fall within the realm of “formal politics” that result in the emergence of the subject as political
(Samaddar 2009), somehow echoing Bayat’s theory of the “quiet encroachment” (Bayat 2009).
Samaddar contended that terms such as “citizen” and “political society” fail to capture what the
“political subject” stands for because it is the “political subject” himself or herself who challenges
the formal political establishment of modern democratic politics, “upsetting at times the fine
calculations of democratic politics (Samaddar, 2009, xvii-xx). Like Ortner and Foucault, Samaddar
also emphasized the role of practices in shaping political subjectivity. The production of the
political subject, he argued, is associated with “a conjunction of circumstances associated with
contentions, events, political practices, and new desires” (Samaddar, 2009, xxv). The political
practices he refers to here include: organizing, voting, negotiating, appealing to law, claiming rights
and identity, mobilizing, associating, demonstrating, dialoguing, refusing to pay taxes, and writing
petitions (Samaddar, 2009, xxiii-xxiv). I will therefore use Samaddar to bring in “politics” to the
discussion of the making of the subjects of the Revolution. In a way, the Revolution as an historical
and a political event has helped transform the realm of the possible and of the “political” by
creating and bringing in new actors, who have henceforth been excluded from “politics” not
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necessarily because they did not want to but because they were marginalized and excluded from
institutional politics. The subject of the Revolution is, therefore, a new actor on the political scene,
who forced his or her agenda into the limelight. The subject of the Revolution is born out of and is
shaped by the process of change that he or she is also actively engaged in shaping.
C-Egyptians, the State and Patriotism
As part of this research, I am seeking to understand the relationship between the individual
and the larger collective to which he or she belongs or the larger structure within which he or she
operates, i.e. that which belongs to the realm of what Ortner called “cultural and social formations”
(Ortner, 2006, 107) that exert power on the subjects. The state and its agents are involved, as I have
mentioned above following Ismail, in the formation of Egyptian youth as subjects of humiliation.
Much of the anger displayed by the protesters during the Revolution was directed against the state
and its representatives, in particular the police. Similarly, a lot of the demands were framed as
citizenship rights, including the very right to protest--even though the protesters may have not
framed them as “citizenship rights” as I will later show in the thesis. Therefore, I find it important
to discuss the Egyptian state and the framework of citizenship. I will also engage in a discussion of
the display of “love for the country” by protesters that I and other social scientists (including
Bamyeh 2011) noticed during and after the Revolution. In his preliminary observations of Tahrir
Square, Bamyeh argued that such expressions amount to “patriotism” (Bamyeh, Feb. 11, 2011). He
explained: “I saw patriotism expressed everywhere as collective pride in the realization that people
who did not know each other could act together, intentionally and with a purpose.” (Bamyeh, Feb.
11, 2011).
The Egyptian state is almost non-existent as a service provider and a guarantor of rights, but
it is present in the lives of its citizens through practices of coercion and corruption. I again refer to
Salwa Ismail’s study of Cairo’s new popular quarters. Ismail explained that the state makes up for
its inability to govern these popular areas at a distance by infiltrating them through its police
apparatus whose job is to monitor and patrol these streets. Under this “police project”, state agents
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inspect markets and food supplies, implement health regulations and carry out practices whose
objective is to discipline the defiant subject (Ismail, 2006, xxx). Ismail referred to the “fuzziness of
the construct of the state and its elusive and slippery character” (Ismail, 2006, xxxii). In a similar
vein, Veena Das described the state in India as “neither a purely rational-bureaucratic organization
nor simply a fetish, but as a form of regulation that oscillates between a rational mode and a
magical mode of being” (Das, 2007, 162). What is relevant to my discussion here is Das’s
statement: “[T]he state can penetrate the life of the community and yet remain distant and elusive”
(Das, 2007, 178). Galal Amin described the Egyptian state as a “soft state”, drawing on the idea
presented by Swedish economist and sociologist Karl Gunnar Myrdal. Corruption is the hallmark of
the soft state, through which it spreads from the executive power to the legislative and from the
legislative to the judiciary. The weakness of the state fosters corruption, the spread of which further
weakens the state (Amin, 2011, 7-8). If not completely totalitarian, the Egyptian state has since the
1980s remained a soft state and maintained many of the restrictions on individual freedoms
imposed under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s totalitarian regime (Amin, 2011, 38).
The soft yet coercive state was alienating its citizens, a lot of whom--including the
participants in this research--did not even think of themselves as “citizens” despite the state’s
propagandist effort at giving them the illusion that they were. Mubarak’s now defunct party, The
National Democratic Party, had campaigned a lot to spread what it called “New Thinking” that
promoted neoliberalism and citizenship, but it failed to find a following among most Egyptians. The
legal status of Egyptian as citizens has over the past 30 years been rendered obsolete, and the
rhetoric of rights and duties was hollow. In theory, “citizenship” is defined as a “certificate
regulating the relationship between the individual and the state” the right to which people win from
the state through struggle and sometimes revolution, oftentimes at a heavy sacrifice with the
persistent resistance of the state (Davis, 2000, 50). T. H. Marshall divided citizenship rights into
three components: civil, political, and social. Civil rights guarantee the person’s freedom, including
freedom of speech, thought, and faith, and the right to own property and access the justice system,
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with the courts representing the relevant institution for such an endeavor. Political rights guarantee
the political participation of individuals, whether by becoming members of elected bodies or by
electing such members, with such rights represented by parliament and local authorities. Social
rights entail an entitlement to a modicum of economic welfare and security, a share in the social
heritage, and the opportunity to live as a “civilized being” in line with standards prevalent in the
society in question, with the education system and social services being the relevant institutions for
the guarantee of such rights (Marshall, 1964, 71-2).
Marshall’s framework will be useful in that it presents an ideal model against which one can
assess discourses, debates and negotiations about citizenship rights in Egypt. Participants in this
research alluded to these three categories of citizenship throughout the interviews. As such, they
lacked what Brubaker titled “substantive citizenship”, even though the government argues that they
have “formal citizenship”, or status of being a member in the nation-state. “[O]ne can possess
formal state membership yet be excluded (in law or fact) from certain political, civil, or social rights
or from effective participation in the business of rule in a variety of settings” (Bottomore, 1992, 66).
Egyptian state institutions, especially the police, acted through power relations to produce
Egyptians as subjects of humiliation and oppression through various practices, such as random
identity police checks. The state, for Egyptians, was an ambiguous entity, appearing and
disappearing in their lives abruptly. And the citizen-subject only concerned the state in so far as he
or she was intransigent and had to be brought under control. In a sense, the state was the face or the
physical incarnation of that Egyptian collective to which they legally, but not necessarily
emotionally, belonged. They held anger and frustration towards that entity, and scoffed at the term
“citizen”, which was void of substantial content. During the January 25 Revolution, a large portion
of their anger was against that very state.
However, one phenomenon that I, and many others including Mohammed Bamyeh (Bamyeh
2011), observed was that a repertoire associated with the Egyptian nation, the most ostensible
symbol being Egypt’s flag, was extensively used by protesters during the 18 days. The Egyptian
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flag was omnipresent from the very first day of demonstrations as it was carried by protesters in the
marches, with some wrapping it around their heads or shoulders and others painting it on their faces
and hands. People in Tahrir Square often chanted the national anthem and sang along to patriotic
songs that blared out of loudspeakers. “Egypt, mother! Here are your children! They tolerated
bitterness for your sake!” (Masr ya omm! Weladek ahom! Dol ‘alashanek shalo el hamm!”) was a
slogan oftentimes repeated by the protesters. Some protesters described their participation in the
demonstrations against Mubarak as “an act for the sake of this country” (‘ashan el balad dih) and
spoke of their “love for the country” (hob el balad). This display of “love for the country” during
the 18 days was no doubt shaped by the historical and political context in which it emerged,
distinguishing it from similar expressions in other contexts, such as when the Egyptian national
football team played against another team. So although there was hatred towards the Egyptian state,
there was “love” for Egypt.
The theoretical concepts of nationalism and patriotism have been used to explain public
displays of “love for the country”--among other phenomena--such as in the case of the American
nationalism after September 11 (Puri 2004, Gellner 1983). The scholarly literature on nations and
nationalism is very wide and has been developed in various contexts, ranging from European,
colonial to postcolonial and Third Worldist (Gellner 1983, Smith 1989). I will, however, only select
ideas that are relevant to the Egyptian protests. A general definition of nationalism is that it is a set
of beliefs and practices that aim at creating a unified community with delineated boundaries in
which all members are similar and equal and share a sense of belonging. Belonging to a nation is
presented as more important than other forms of belonging, such as that to a family or an ethnic
group, and is central in differentiating members of one nation from those of another (Puri, 2004, 23).
Nationalism has been used as a political ideology by post-colonial regimes to reassert state
legitimacy or advance their social agenda, especially during periods of destabilization. Through
employing “banal nationalism”, i.e. the “flagging” of the nation (and its symbols) in the everyday
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life of citizens”, the regime is concerned with grabbing and maintaining power (Abdel Rahman,
2007, 285-286). The Egyptian state has been known to use this nationalistic discourse, as in the
case of its stifling of Non-Governmental Organizations as was shown by Maha Abdel Rahman
(Abdel Rahman 2007). So in a way, the Egyptian state employed nationalistic rhetoric to hush
opposition that threatened its legitimacy, which is what it attempted to do with the January 25
protests by claiming that the demonstrators were representing foreign interests and were bound on
destroying the Egyptian nation. In return, Egyptian protesters challenged this discourse in various
ways as if saying: “we are Egyptian too and we love Egypt and that is why we are protesting”.
This display of “love for the country” shared some characteristics with the kind of
nationalism theorized by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. By aggregating in the physical
space of Tahrir Square, Egyptians of all walks of life came face to face with each other, thus
claiming a certain sameness based on a sensibility of all belonging to the Egyptian nation that
superseded any other belonging, whether religious or class-based. However, the absence of a state
as a promoter of official nationalism distinguishes this phenomenon from other forms of
nationalism. As I mentioned above, the Egyptians gathered in Tahrir were against the Egyptian
state, but that did not prevent them from displaying love for their country Egypt. This research
attempts to explain this phenomenon of “love for the country”, which is not associated with the
state, and how patriotism partly shaped the experience of protest and the subjectivities of the
participants. Based on my observations and following Bamyeh (2011), I argue that some protest
participants’ words and actions were colored by “patriotism,” or to be more precise, a particular
form of “patriotism” tied to the historical moment of the Revolution. This patriotism is different
from the form described by Puri, i.e. the “expression of loyalty to the state” (Puri, 2004, 87). It is
similar neither to the form of nationalism as an ideology employed by the state (Abdel Rahman
2007) nor to the chauvinistic sentiments expressed by members of the nation-state at times of wars
or football matches. Such chauvinistic nationalist sentiments were expressed in the Egyptian media
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and were echoed on the streets by ordinary people before and after Egypt’s national football team
played against the Algerian national team in the qualifications for the World Cup in 2009.
D- Narration and Production of History
In the pages to follow I present the perspective of the subjects through the medium of
narration. That is why it is important to present a review of such theories and studies that deal with
production of history and narration. This thesis takes as it starting point David William Cohen’s
definition of production of history as:
“The processing of the past in societies and historical settings all over the world, and
the struggles for control of voices and texts in innumerable settings which often
animate the processing of the past... conventions and paradigms in the formation of
historical knowledge and historical texts, the patterns and forces underlying
interpretation, the contentions and struggles which evoke and produce texts, or
particular glosses of tests along with sometimes powerfully nuanced vocabularies, as
well as the structuring frames of record-keeping” (Cohen, 1994, 4-5).

Michel-Rolf Trouillot argued that history is not only produced by academics at universities but is
also constructed by people outside of the guild of historians whether through the media, memorial
celebrations, museums, movies (Trouillot, 1995, 19-20), and the making of history takes place in
several locations that are all linked together (Cohen, 1994, 21). In that sense, this study follows
Trouillot’s advice by seeking to study the production of history outside of the guild of historians,
focusing instead on the narratives of the protesters.
This study is also situated within the literature about protesting, narratives, youth , and
social movements (Polletta 1998a&1998b, Auyero 2002, Kennelly 2009, Getrich 2008). Jacqueline
Kennelly examined how a group of Canadian urban youth were “creatively responding to the vast
array of political, social, and economic changes that make up their world” (Kennelly 2009, 293).
Christina M. Getrich followed a group of second-generation Mexican youth in San Diego as they
engaged with the immigrant rights movement during Spring 2006 (Getrich, 2008), and Francesca
Polletta explored the archives about a movement of Black students in the 1960s (Polletta, 1998a).
Moving beyond protests orchestrated by youth, Auyero presented multiple narratives of people
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involved in the Santiago Del Estero riots in Argentina on December 16. 1993. He presented the
different versions of the story as told by a judge, a cop and a dancer in attempt to explore
“contentious conversations”--a term proposed by Charles Tilly--among those in power, the media,
and the protesters (Auyero, 2002, 154). My study attempts to gain insights into youth protest, while
at the same time contributing to the debate about how narratives and history are constructed in the
context of protest and revolution.
V- Methodology
The primary focus of this study are the narratives of Egyptian youth about their participation
in the protests in relationship to the reasons and the forms of participation, what this participation
meant for them, and the participants’ ideas about national belonging, nationalism and citizenship.
The core sample of this research comprised ten middle-class Egyptians aged between 20 and 35
who, for the first time, took part in mass protests during the 18 days, and who afterwards started to
become engaged in collective social and political action. The sample includes male and female as
well as Muslim and Christian participants who subscribe to different political orientations and two
of whom hail from provinces other than Cairo. I also intentionally selected participants who joined
the 18 days at different points. This research is not concerned with “activists” who have regularly
participated in and organized protests over the years preceding the January 25 Revolution. They
have been the topic of previous research (such as Maha Abdelrahman’s “The Transnational and the
Local: Egyptian Activists and Transnational Protest Networks”). However, what stands out in the
case of the January 25 Revolution is that it was able to draw in individuals with no protest or
activist experience. Participants engaged as individuals and not as part of formal organized groups
or political parties, and they might have participated as part of a group of friends.
I have selected these participants from among the people I have been meeting while taking
part in the 18 days primarily as a journalist, but also as an Egyptian citizen and a part-time
protester. I used my personal connections followed by the snowball method to select the
participants according to the aforementioned categories and set of variables. I first started off
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interviewing a larger sample of people, including older people, and then later decided to focus my
research on youth and particularly those who were not involved in protests or any other form of
collective action before the Revolution. I started my encounter with potential participants in a very
casual manner, asking general questions about their participation in the protests, and then the
subsequent meetings involved in-depth interviews using several sets of open-ended unstructured
questions that depended on the setting of the interview. The sequence of the questions and the
extent to which we delved into one aspect or another differed from one participant to another
depending on several factors, including when he or she joined the protests and what his or her role
has been. It also depended on the dynamics of interaction between the participants and me. For
example, for someone like Mo 5, who joined the protests on the last day right before Mubarak
stepped down, the discussion focused more on what social and political change groups he engaged
with after the ouster of Mubarak rather than on why he participated in the Revolution.
This research was also based on participant observation of the 18 days and the regular
protests that took place in the following year and a half. I conducted the interviews for this research
between July 2011 and May 2012. The temporal unit of analysis in this research is the 18 days of
protest. However, any attempt at understanding the participants’ narratives of that period could only
be accomplished by putting it in an historical context. Therefore, I asked the participants to talk and
narrate anecdotes about their life trajectories, activities, social networks, ideas and affects before
joining and during the protests, and how they carried on their lives after the fall of Mubarak,
including whether they were involved in further protests and social or public work.
This research is qualitative, and more specifically an analysis of narratives and historical
accounts of participants on the 18 days of protests that started on January 25. In contrast to media
accounts in which protesters’ quotes are published after being jotted down by journalists in a hurry
against the clamor of slogans chanted loudly or while interlocutors are trying to dodge rubber
bullets, accounts in this research have been collected over a longer period of time and--with a few
5

All names used in this research are pseudonyms as I will explain in the next section.
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exceptions--in a more relaxed setting. Therefore, it has the advantage of allowing participants more
time to recall, make sense of and narrate, forget and eliminate memories of the events.
VI- Ethical Considerations, Challenges and Limitations
This research is a qualitative one that brought me in direct contact with the participants for an
extended period of time. The main two issues of concern were breaching the privacy of the
participants and keeping their identity and information confidential. I tried to overcome the first
problem is to take time to establish rapport with the participants and give them the chance to get to
know me well enough so they would not feel that their privacy was being breached. At the same
time, participants had the right to discontinue engaging in this research should they feel
uncomfortable at any time. I reiterated to them that they hold the right to withdraw from the
research anytime they wish when and/or if they think participation is causing them any kind of
distress or harm without giving any reasons for such a withdrawal. I also made sure to let the
participants know where the information will be published and gave them the right to have them
identified or unidentified in the research depending on their preference. At the end, I decided to
keep all their identities anonymous just in case identifying them might cause them trouble in the
future, so all the names that appear in this research except one--Ahmed, which is a common name-have been changed. I took down notes and recorded the participants’ testimonies using a digital
voice recorder during the interviews and downloaded the voice files on my personal computer,
which is accessed only by myself. I assured them they also have the right to identify certain topics
as public and other topics as confidential, which helped them feel more comfortable when talking to
me knowing that only the topics they have identified as public will be published.
My subject position as an Egyptian woman who has taken part in the protests both as a
journalist and a participant contributed somehow to the facilitation of communication between the
participants and myself since we both have a shared experience of the same event. On the other
hand, it may have also posed a challenge. During the course of the interviews, I was also challenged
by some participants’ misinterpretation or misunderstanding of questions and their “scripted
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responses”, those that the participants give out as an initial statement. These weakness were
mitigated by spending more time in the introductory phase until I got a general understanding of
each participant’s conversation style and background and by making sure during subsequent
dialogues to clarify my questions and check with participants regarding what they mean when they
talk about certain terms that may appear ambiguous. I used the follow-up interviews to go over the
points that I thought might have been based on assumptions. For example, in one interview, a
participant told me he joined the protests because he wanted the country to improve (‘ayez el balad
teb’a ahsan). We both understood what el balad, the country, means, but it may mean different
things for each one of us. These sorts of ambiguous terms that I spent a lot of time discussing with
the participants, and this was at the heart of this research.
Since protests were still ongoing while I was conducting interviews, and the general
situation in the country was still precarious during the transitional period following Mubarak’s
ouster, I bore in mind the sensitivities and the risks the participants may be exposed to, especially
given that the authorities still sporadically rounded up people involved in protests, some of whom
were accused of being “thugs” and ended up facing military tribunals. I do not know that any of the
participants in this research were arrested. Also, I faced the risk of being regarded with suspicion by
the potential participants of the research due to my position as a student at an institution whose
name is affiliated with America, i.e. the American University in Cairo. State-owned television and
newspapers and other media that were deemed biased towards the former regime -- and even under
the transitional government -- have claimed at various occasions that there were spies and agents
working for the interest of foreign governments, with the U.S. being identified as one of them,
among the protesters. Therefore, I faced at least one situation where a potential participant asked me
if my research is conducted on behalf of the U.S. Pentagon. I explained to him that although the
institution I am affiliated with is American, it is a private university that is not linked to the
government of the U.S. and that the manuscript of the research I am conducting will be available to
the public on the library shelves at the university’s campus in New Cairo.
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VII-Terminology
I do not believe that the January 25 protests and sit-in and the changes in political power that
resulted from it amount to a fully-fledged revolution -- at least of yet -- as the political, economic,
and social system has not been totally replaced with a new one. Asef Bayat likened the Egyptian
and Tunisian trajectories of change to Georgia’s Rose Revolution of 2003 and Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution of November 2004-January 2005, calling them “refo-lutions”, mixing “reform”
measures with “revolutions”. Such models of revolution bring about reforms in the institutions of
the existing states (Bayat, March 3, 2011), falling short of a total system overhaul seen in earlier
revolutions, such as the Iranian revolution of 1979. Nevertheless, I will in this research use the
word Revolution in two senses-- as the research participants themselves do. In the first sense, for
example when participants say “after the Revolution”, i.e. after Mubarak stepped down on February
11, “revolution” here means the 18 days. In the second sense, i.e. when they say the “Revolution
continues”, they are referring to the ongoing and unfolding process of transition following the
ouster of Mubarak as all the participants in this research -- and I agree with them -- believe the
process of revolutionary change is still continuing, and contrary to the official narrative, the
Revolution has not yet concluded.
In this research, I will refer to participants in this research as subjects. According to MichelRolph Trouillot, history as a social process, deals with people in three different capacities: as
agents, or “occupants of structural positions”; as actors, “in constant interface with a context”; and
as subjects; “as voices aware of their vocality” (Trouillot, 1995, 23). I prefer to use the third term
because the terms by which people define their historical experience, which is at the heart of this
enquiry through narrative form, designates them as subjects. People are “subjects of history” in as
much as they “define the very terms under which some situations can be described. A historical
event, such as a strike cannot be described as such, unless those involved in the strike describe it as
such or to use Trouillot’s words “making the subjective capacities of the workers a central part of
the description” (Trouillot, 1995, 23). This is the approach I take in this research.
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VIII- Biographies of Participants
In this section, I present a short biography of the ten main participants of the research. All
the names have been changed and are presented in an alphabetical order.
Ahmed is a physicist in his thirties. He is originally from Aswan but lives in Cairo, where he works
at a government agency.
Albert is an engineer in his thirties. He works for a private company in Cairo and lives in Zamalek.
Donia is an owner of a private business in her thirties. She is originally from Alexandria but has
been living in Cairo for the past decade. She works and lives in downtown.
Essam is a student of art in his mid twenties. He was raised in a southern Egyptian province and
moved to Cairo to attend a private foreign university a few years ago. He resides in New Cairo.
Jailan is an architect in her thirties. She lives with her family in Heliopolis.
John is a student of business in his early twenties. He was born and raised in Egypt but lived for a
few years in the United States. He lives in the neighborhood of Faisal on the outskirts of greater
Cairo. Beside studying, he works as a free-lance interpreter.
Mo is a government employee in his early twenties. He lives in Dar El Salam, a district of Old
Cairo.
Mona is in her early thirties. She works for an international non-governmental organization in
Cairo.
Mohamed works in information technology at a private company in Cairo. He was born and raised
in the eastern city of Port Said.
Noha is a decoration artist in her early thirties. After graduating from Law School, she completed
another degree in art. She lives in Haram district with her mother, two sisters and her three-year-old
daughter.
Chapter Two
Narratives of the 18 Days
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The terms “Revolution” and “18 days” refer simultaneously to the historical period and the
historical event that stretched between January 25 and February 11. The words have been used
interchangeably in official and media discourses as well as by ordinary people on the street,
creating confusion about what the speakers are referring to, and such state of confusion, sometimes
deliberately and at other times unintentional, creates fertile soil for misunderstanding and
manipulation. These terms, among others, are used by the ruling authorities to legitimize their
policies as well as by the protesters to give legitimacy to their demands and their cause. In this
sense, the debate about the events of the 18 days is contentious. Narratives about the 18 days have
been skewed and appropriated by the different parties for various purposes, making this period a
crucial unit of analysis if we were to understand the debates and deliberations that permeated the
transitional period after the ouster of Mubarak and that are bound to continue for decades to come.
But in another sense, such variations in narration and the skewing and the manipulation thereof may
not necessarily always be intentional. These narratives could also partially--but could also wholly-be a factor of who the narrators are and the positions they occupy and from which they speak. The
narrators might not be necessarily skewing, distorting, selecting and eliminating details on purpose.
In all cases, however, at such uncertain times when people in power are trying to mold history in
such a way that serves their interests, it is crucial to record history from the perspective of the
individuals who are not in power, i.e. the subjects who are at the heart of this research.
This chapter aims to document the participants’ accounts of how the events known as the
Revolution unfolded with the objective of identifying moments of significance and debatable
themes. This chapter seeks to present a kind of history composed by those who were involved in the
protests and in so doing illustrating how the single event of the Revolution, or rather the series of
events dubbed Revolution, has been narrated differently by the different participants and how such
narrations shape the narrators’ subjectivity. In sum, this chapter explores the link between narration
and the making of the narrators as subjects of history and as members of a collective of which such
narration is constitutive.
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I- Production of History
History is produced and shaped by the people who narrate it and who are themselves part of
the story they are narrating. Through their narration, they emerge as subjects of that historical event.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot distinguished between two levels of history: history as a socio-historical
process, i.e. as events that happened; and history as knowledge of that process, or what is said to
have happened. That the distinction between these two levels is not always clear may in itself be
historical (Trouillot, 1995, 3-4). Thus, what follows is the “story” of the “story” of the “story”, the
challenge of which is to analyze the process by which these stories unfold and to recognize “the
edges of our stories and of the stories being told to us from the past, to work toward comprehending
the forces emergent at these edges”, as David William Cohen put it (Cohen, 1994, 21). What is at
stake, then, is “not looking at a story but rather at a skeletal account of stories of stories” (Cohen,
1994, 21). In short, “history reveals itself only through the production of specific narratives. What
matters most are the process and the conditions of production of such narratives”, Trouilllot argued
(Trouillot, 1995, 25).
And if one was to analyze these stories or “second-level” abstractions, as Trouillot described
it, while being aware of the forces at play on the “edges” of those stories, one has to look at the
question of power. One has to bear in mind how power is exerted and how it infiltrates and shapes
any narrative. According to Trouillot, power is not a factor that is external to the story but is rather
interwoven within the story. It enters not at one point and then remains there, but power intersects
the story at different times and from different positions. It precedes the narrative and is a component
in its creation and its interpretation (Trouillot, 1995, 28-29). And as Trouillot and Cohen argued,
power manifests itself and exerts its weight through the mechanisms of silencing, remembering and
forgetting.
The participants of this research might have told their narratives or parts of them before to
their friends, families, or the media, and will probably narrate them over and over, with some of
these narratives becoming hegemonic. While some details stand out clearly in the memory of the
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narrators, other details fade, are confused with the intricacies of later similar events, or were
altogether completely obliterated. As time passes, some more details will be eliminated, while
others will remain and yet others may be re-remembered, all depending on a complex process that is
shaped by the context and the circumstances. Cohen argued that remembering and forgetting are not
contradictory but are in fact intertwined in the same process, whereby remembering certain details
involves or requires the forgetting of others. Forgetting does not involve disappearance but is in fact
reshaped by the onset of new conditions (Cohen, 1994, xxiv). Johannes Fabian further argued that
memory as equated with remembering on the one hand should not be contrasted with forgetting as
tantamount to not-remembering on the other hand. Conversely, remembering and forgetting should
be understood as constituting “memory work”, i.e. that critical work required to produce memory
that could be shared through narration, exhibition and performance (Fabian, 2003, 490). Forgetting,
according to Ashis Nandy, could be typified into “unwitting forgetfulness”, which helps a person
make peace with the world and live in it; “adaptive forgetfulness”, which enables a person or a
society to let go of unnecessary memories because they cannot afford to remember everything; and
“principled forgetting”, which is directed against the very enterprise of history and rejected by it
since under that “historical mode” of constructing the past, remembering is superior to forgetting
(Nandy, 1995, 47-48).
Trouillot argued that there is an interplay between silence and power and that not all silences
are equal. Silences enter the process of historical production at four key moments: “the moment of
fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the
moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance
(the making of history in the final instance)” (Trouillot, 1995, 26). “[A]ny historical narrative is a
particular bundle of silences, the result of a unique process, and the operation required to
deconstruct these silences will vary accordingly” (Trouillot, 1995, 27).
II- Narrative as “Truth”
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Each person narrating a narrative claims that his or her version is the “truth”, but some
narratives gain more credibility than others. Arjun Appadurai argued that there are limits to what
could pass as a credible narrative and that there are certain criteria regulating such debates about the
past that are contested under a specific political context by contending social groups (Appadurai,
1981, 201-202). The four dimensions that form the minimal requirement for the cultural
construction of the past are: authority, which involves the source or guarantor of the “past”;
continuity, which describes the cultural consensus regarding the tie with the source of authority;
depth, which involves cultural consensus on value assigned to the past; and interdependence, which
signals the interdependence of the past in question with other “pasts” to guarantee credibility
(Appadurai, 1981, 203). And for an historical narrative to be set apart from fiction, Trouillot
argued, it is necessary for a historically specific group of humans to decide upon its credibility.
“[T]he epistemological break between history and fiction is always expressed concretely through
the historically situated evaluation of specific narratives” (Trouillot, 1995, 8). Therefore, any
narrative claiming to be historical must be based on something concrete or evidence as opposed to
fiction which is required to be based on no foundation other than imagination, and it should be
accepted as such by a specific group of people. But Trouillot further explained why in some cases
the truthfulness and the factuality of narratives is important: because the interests of particular
collectivities are tied to the historical credibility of particular narratives (Trouillot, 1995, 13) and
because even to people who have not necessarily lived through those past events, their making as
subjects is closely associated with the constant creation of the past (Trouillot, 1995, 16).
Turning to this research, rather than being concerned with what “really” happened, it is
about what people, in this case the participants, say about what happened, along the line of
Trouillot’s question: “how much can we reduce what happened to what is said to have happened?”
(Trouillot, 1995, 13). The process of narration, how narratives about the Revolution are constructed,
the language participants use to describe the historical event, and the meanings emerging from such
processes are central to this inquiry. This research is more concerned with insight into what Javier
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Auyero described as “the interests of the teller, the desires and the dreams beneath those interests”,
which one can gain insight into even through the “wrong” tale (Auyero, 2002, 170). Oral sources
provide us with information not on what people actually did but more on what they wanted to do,
what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did back then. The credibility of
such oral sources derives not from their function in stating facts but rather in revealing the
meanings attached to these facts (Auyero, 2002, 169-170).
Therefore, narration is a medium by which the subjectivity of narrators is shaped, i.e.
“people are the subjects of history” (Trouillot, 1995, 23). “Their subjectivity is an integral part of
the event and of any satisfactory description of that event” (Trouillot, 1995, 24). “[T]he collective
subjects who supposedly remember did not exist as such at the time of the events they claim to
remember. Rather, their constitution as subjects goes hand in hand with the continuous creation of
the past” (Trouillot, 1995, 16). The following narratives of Egyptian youth about the Revolution as
an event, will provide insight into the process by which their subjectivity was formed. As they
sought to make sense of the events, they were also shaping their subjectivity as protesters and as
Revolution supporters.
III- The Stories
In this part of the chapter, I use the accounts of seven of the research participants because
they were the ones who witnessed the days when key events occurred. I focus in particular on
Mona’s narrative because she provided detailed descriptions compared with others. I also mention
an eighth participant, Donia, in the last section. I have identified specific moments of significance
based on the interviews during which participants either highlighted out of their own accord these
specific moments when asked to give an account of the events or described them when asked to
narrate what happened at those moments. The moments identified here are the same ones
highlighted by the media and in books detailing accounts of the 18 days whether autobiographical
or otherwise, such as renowned poet Abdel Rahman Youssef’s “Dairy of a Cactus Revolution”
(Youssef 2011), Mona Prince’s “My Name is Revolution” (Prince 2012), and Hatem Rushdy’s “18
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Days in Tahrir” (Rushdy 2011). These moments are: January 25, the first day demonstrations
started; January 28, the Friday of Rage when the first large-scale killing of protesters took place and
the occupation of Tahrir Square started; February 2, the Battle of the Camel, during which those
perceived as Mubarak supporters stormed Tahrir Square on camels and horses to attack protesters;
and February 11, the day Mubarak stepped down. Within these days, there is another level of
“moments of significance”, which are the more personal and subjective moments, including those
times when participants felt significant feelings of joy, solidarity, fear, uncertainty, hope and
frustration, etc.
For the participants of this research, protesting and joining the sit-in were things they were
doing for the first time -- they were novices and the events were a novelty. Through their narration,
they were trying to recall minute details and make out blurry images to try to make sense of them to
themselves in the first place but also to the ethnographer. While some struggled sometimes in the
course of the narration, the task was easier for others. Sometimes, the narration was clear, while
other times, it was a complete mess, and I would be left puzzled trying to work out what happened.
I felt that some times, the participants were trying to help me clarify some things or were striving to
be coherent in storytelling. The time gap between the “event” and the narration of the “event”
ranges from several months to more than a year as the bulk of these accounts were collected
between January 2012 and May 2012, with some pilot interviews preceding these and short followup interviews conducted afterwards.
Undoubtedly, the participants’ narration is colored by their interpretation of current events
and their mood at the time of the interview. What they say about these events now may not be the
same as what they said about them a few months or a year ago. Their narration of the same events
may even change further in the future. The narratives were also constructed against the backdrop of
a wider and constantly changing nationally and publicly framed meta-narrative in which certain
details were silenced while others were highlighted. Their narratives sometimes intersect with and
echo the official government and media narrative and at other times, diverge from it. The meta38

narrative here refers to the version of the stories about the Revolution that are perpetuated by the
ruling government, namely the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces. That is not to say that such
a narrative is homogenous, but what makes it the “meta-narrative” is that it is the one that is
constantly beamed on television channels and circulated widely in the media due to the powerful
influence of its promoters.
In this section, I present the stories of the protesters about the moments of significance
outlined above, whether those taking place at the epicenter of the protests in Tahrir Square, in the
residential neighborhoods of the capital, or in the provinces. The three themes that permeate these
stories and which participants associated with the protests and the sit-in are: novelty, peacefulness
and co-existence. These three themes will be analyzed in the following section. I have, in most
instances, used direct quotes in order to relay to the reader the language of the protesters--in an
attempt to remain as true possible to the meanings intended by the speakers. All interviewees -except John who spoke mostly in English-- spoke in their native language, Arabic, and all of them -except Ahmed who spoke only in Arabic-- peppered their sentences with English words. I have
included Arabic translation of certain terms and expressions whenever needed.
A-The “first” time, January 25
Mona heeded the calls to join the demonstrations on the first day. She joined one of the
marches entering Tahrir Square from Kasr El Nil Bridge on January 25. The march she was part of
was not intercepted by security forces as were some other marches, particularly the one coming
from Kasr El Eini Street, where the parliament an Cabinet buildings are located. It was Mona’s first
time partaking in such a large-scale demonstration as it was for thousands of others. She reflected
on those first moments in the Square:
“As soon as we entered the Square, some people kept saying ‘Do not think that we
have occupied the square. They [the security forces] will invade [it] at night’. A
friend of mine kept convincing me that we should to leave, while other friends
wanted to stay... they [the security forces] threw one tear gas canister from afar. It
was only one canister and [its effect] was weak, but we all couldn’t stand it. We
were not [yet] used to tear gas. [She laughs and then I laugh]. It was still early, that
was as soon as darkness fell”.
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Mona eventually acquiesced to the friend who kept asking her to leave the Square for fear that they
be caught in the battles between the protesters and the security forces.
Meanwhile, Essam had been following news of the unfolding protests on social media and
on satellite television channels, when he and a group of friends finally decided to take to the streets.
Essam remembered:
“[On January 25], it was the first time in my life to stand in front of a [police]
armored vehicle... They said they are about to fire. We formed lines in front of the
tank to prevent them from entering the square, but what happened was that--as it was
the first time for many people to go to a protest--as soon as the attack began, we ran
off. There was tear gas. It was 12:30 [a.m.]. We ran. It was the first time for me to
hear the sound of shots, the first time to see the spark and the canons flying around
and so on. So we ran. The square filled with gas. It was impossible to remain there,
we would have suffocated. We were running through white clouds. Of course, it was
the first time for me to feel the effect of it. It was a horrible feeling... I was pushed
into a dead-end street, and because I had lost my identification card, I had a feeling
that if I were imprisoned, I will never come out [of prison]... I lost my friends again.
It was a feeling of fear. We hid in a storage room and were locked in. We didn’t
know [the effect of water when mixed with tear gas], so we washed our faces with
water, which made our faces burn even harder. For some of the time, I didn’t know if
I was in reality or in a dream. It was for me a bit shocking .”

John, who was also protesting for the first time, had a similar story:
“When I first reached [Tahrir Square on January 25], it looked normal... There were
some crowds. But when I entered Kasr El Eini street, I found a lot of people were
running in the opposite direction [towards me], so [I knew] for sure that the action
was straight ahead, so I kept dodging [people] until I saw the police firing tear gas,
so I started throwing rocks. I still didn’t smell the gas. I thought the gas was a smoke
screen. When I first smelled it, I collapsed, figuratively enhart [he uses this Arabic
translation of collapsed while narrating the rest in English]. I tried to throw rocks
again, there was a wounded guy, I kind of escorted him to safety and then
continued... There was a woman standing next to a lamp post that has electrical
boxes. The woman was banging on one of those, so I told her ‘let me do it’. So I
started banging and then shouting masr ![Egypt!], one bang and then masr!... back
then, I was hit with a small stone on my head. I tried to encourage most of the people
to come with me to the front line but most of them were like ‘Selmeya! Selmeya!
Let’s stick to the backside. Most of the people in the front are thugs (baltageyya).
So I continued to the front along with four or five others. After that, we were hit by
tear gas. It was overwhelming so I had to kind of go back... One guy was trying to
break a traffic light but people stopped him, anyone who was trying to break
anything was being stopped.”
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B-Fighting for Tahrir, January 28
After she had left Tahrir Square on January 25, Mona had tried to come back to it in the
following two days, but was prevented by the security police deployed all around the downtown
area. She did, however, make a return on January 28. After agreeing with her friends before mobilephone lines were cut earlier that day, Mona left her home in Heliopolis to “meet” friends some 20
kilometers away in a coffee place in Mohandiseen. Although no one spoke about aloud, everybody
there knew why they were all gathering in this place at this time. After she finished her coffee, she
lined up to go to the bathroom and winked at one of her acquaintances, signaling that they both
knew why they were there and what was about to happen. Then, in groups of four or five, the
customers left the shop, Mona among them, and headed out to the street, where they filed past a
man-made cordon of black-clad security forces to join swarms of protesters-to-be in front of the
Mostafa Mahmoud Mosque. As the Imam was announcing through loudspeakers the end of the
Friday prayer and before he even finished his second prayer closure (al salamou alaykom wa
rahmatollah), chants of “The people want to topple the regime!” (El sha’b youreed isqaat el
nizaam) echoed out loud and rocked the area.
Earlier that morning of January 28, Mona’s mother had given her a bunch of small bottles
filled with vinegar, and she had taken masks, an abundance of them, so she could distribute to
people around her. When the police started firing tear gas, she started running not knowing in which
direction to go. She narrated:
“You were just running not knowing [which direction] is worse. But I was scared
that one of them [the canisters] would fall in the wrong position or fall beside me
and I wouldn’t be able to breathe... [Then she marched along with thousands towards
Tahrir Square]... After entering the Square, she said: “I looked at my side and found
the scene was completely nightmarish. I saw people holding a brass rod and they
kept banging [on the railings]... I told them to throw away th[ose] chains so we
would not be described as riffraff (re’aa’)... Then I headed further into downtown, I
saw a man holding a dagger... all these were scenes that were completely surreal as if
I was really in a nightmare. As much as I felt that we have succeeded, I was also
wondering what was happening to us... [Then she bumped into a friend]... When
Naim saw me, he told me ‘Congratulations!’ He was the one who made me realize
that we have partly triumphed and that we are witnessing the beginning of something
that will continue.”
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When the security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets and used batons to hit the
demonstrators, those who could fight back did. Essam witnessed some of those scenes as such:
“There were some officers who ran off and officers who were scared somebody
would kill them,” he recalled. “But of course, everyone was like ‘Selmeyya!
Selmeyya!’ (Peaceful! Peaceful!). They caught a soldier from the front [rows],
people were hitting him hard. He was one of the soldiers who were firing [at the
protesters]. They surrounded the soldier and formed a cordon around him. People
wanted to hit him but still we snatched him and took him to the battalion (el
kateeba)... We started to withdraw back to Zamalek and people stopped at the
entrance to Al Ahly club. They started to set up barricades and collect rocks. It was
no longer peaceful (selmi) as we thought. It is wrong to believe that the protests
broke the barricades peacefully because there are people who died trying to break
these security cordons, breaking through them to allow other people to pass. There
were clashes between people and the security at the barriers in which hands, rocks
and any other possible things were used.”

By the end of the day, thousands of protesters had occupied Tahrir Square after the security
forces disappeared following fierce battles in which hundreds of protesters were either killed or
wounded. The army was deployed and a 6-p.m. curfew was announced. That night, some protesters
pitched tents, starting what was to become a two-week sit-in. Mona would visit the square almost
every day, participating in different activities as needed.
C- In the provinces, January 28
A similar story was unfolding in Zagazig, a city in the Delta province of Sharqeyya, where
Ahmed happened to be on a business trip. After he heard the protesters’ chants, he decided to join
them. He recalled:
“Our numbers were increasing after the prayer... They [the security forces]... had
instructions to fire [tear] gas right after the prayer.... they thought that once they fired
the gas, we would go off running barefoot and leave our shoes behind and be scared
and so on. But God willed it that way. It was unplanned. There were lots of things
that were divine (tawfeeq ilaahy). They keep saying there were plans and so on. But
what I lived through proves that all of this is not true. It was God’s will that the
people having been frustrated and having had enough (men kotr el-zaha’ welkhan’a), started running towards them [instead of running away from them]... they
[the security forces] did not expect it... they thought in each area they would [only]
have 200 people whom they could easily control... [On this day], it was as if [we
were witnessing] something we were waiting for that God has sent to us. It came,
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and everyone went out [to the streets] without any preparations (tarteebat) or
anything. Tunisia has just happened before and triggered our enthusiasm and several
people immolated themselves in front of the parliament and the cabinet buildings in
addition to the rigging of the elections. All of these factors came together and created
the state of frustration (ghalayaan) and the explosion that happened.”
“With the pressure and with increasing numbers [of protesters], instead of them
[police] surrounding us, they were the ones who were being surrounded from here
and there. They were in the middle of us... Their strength and determination began to
wane... and to prove to you that our revolution was not bloody--and there are
documented images--when the soldiers threw their shields and batons and some
youth wanted to attack them, we objected and stood in the way telling them that
these soldiers are poor (ghalaba) and are like us and they have nothing to do with
this (malhomsh zanb). The soldiers started to join us and the youth held them up on
the shoulders, running around with them and chanting with them... but the pressure
was still on the (higher ranking) officers.”
D- Around the neighborhoods, January 26-28
John narrated how and why he ventured into the backstreets in a working class
neighborhood near his house on January 27. He said:
“I found a lot of armored vehicles so I went through the side streets and encouraged
people to come down to the street and do something about it and shouted ‘Men of
the neighborhood, where is the gas? We need gas [to set some tires on fire], these
[security vehicles] are here to terrorize us’, I said. I was shouting at people.”

I asked him if he was afraid that people would condemn him for doing that to which he
replied, “You’re going against the cops, no one likes cops, no one unless he’s a mokhber (informer).
I got some of them (the people), I became kind of a leader, I remember this little kid going like
‘Sheikh, you are the one who will lead us’ (ya sheikh enta elli hatqoudna)”. We both laughed. John
grows a beard and is Christian. He went on to narrate his attempts to set some tires ablaze with the
help of neighborhood residents. His narration was in line with the novelty theme discussed above.
Such was apparent in a phrases like “I’ve never done this before” when he was trying to describe
how to set the tires on fire. When I asked him why he wanted to set it on fire, he replied “ So that
they [the security] won’t enter, it was kind of a barricade, they were entering and throwing [tear]
gas”. But John was intent on completing his mission: Urging people to participate in the following
day’s protest on January 28.
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Albert also told me that he and his friends staged small-scale demonstrations in residential
areas, such as Embaba, a working class neighborhood, on January 26 and 27. “Sometimes the
protest starts off with 50 or 60 participants and grows up to 3,000 or 4,000. This was in Boulaq and
Embaba. It[s momentum] increased because of the tear gas bombs they [the security police] threw
in popular areas... and they used to arrest a lot of people,” he said. He told me that he and his
friends also tried to stage a protest in the upper class district of Heliopolis on January 28 but failed
to due to the lack of participants after which they joined the bigger protests in downtown Cairo.
E-The Tahrir sit-in, January 28-February 11
As the security forces withdrew from Tahrir Square on January 28, some protesters stayed
on in the square, while others left only to return almost every day for the next two weeks. A
community evolved in the Square, of which Mona and others were part of. Participants usually
remember Tahrir as a Utopia. Noha’s version is such an instance:
“The 18 days in and of themselves are a dream, a legend and all of that,” she says.
“I couldn’t have thought that I would be like this in a state whereby one would be
hand in hand with a bearded man while sitting around smoking and you’re signing
together (with him). We never had this state whereby Christians protect Muslims
while they were praying... yes, we are like family and neighbors -- my life-time
friend is Christian -- but I couldn’t have imagined seeing this scene in my life or
living through it...Unity, solidarity and victory... The scene of the Muslim men
praying and the Christians surrounding them.... when the attacks start, everybody
protects everybody else and it doesn’t matter. This is unity. Bread that was
distributed was being shared... dates that were distributed were shared. This is a state
of unity and solidarity that gives you a feeling of victory.”

Essam also saw Tahrir that way. He said:
“When I went [to Tahrir] the next day [after the Battle of the Camel]... something
strange happened to me, something like a shock. I couldn’t believe what was
happening to the people, the community of Tahrir was somehow utopian... everyone
was helping everybody else, they were respecting each other, the number was very
big and there was enthusiasm. People were talking. There was a lot of uninformed
talk (fatei) but that was natural. We do not have political awareness in the first place.
Even me... it was the first time for me to be in such a situation, the first time for me
to know what revolution, protests, sit-in were.”
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Essam narrated a story about how while standing in long queue to buy Koshari, an Egyptian dish
made of rice, lentils and pasta with tomato sauce, a man at the front who had already bought some
insisted on giving him and his friends the six boxes he had bought. And when they offered him
money in return he rejected. He added:
“He said ‘just give the money to some of the youth and tell them to buy some
[koshari] for [the people in] the square’, and that’s what we did,” Essam said.
“Although the Koshari did not taste very good, it was one of the best times in my life
to eat Koshari. I enjoyed it. I really felt that there is a good seed in Egypt that could
grow -- regardless of political or revolutionary affiliations... there are really people
who could transform this country into a good country.”

Mona, however, saw it slightly differently. Mona narrated:
“I did see how much co-existence there was. There was a group of people in a very
nice tent and seated next to them were bearded men who were very conservative. But
it was not the co-existence we see in movies (co-existence el-aflaam) whereby
everybody accepts everybody else. I saw an Islamist pointing to one of their friends
asking why she was smoking cigarettes and doing this and that. Somebody
responded to him saying that cigarettes are not haram [forbidden by religion] and
that each person should do whatever he wants.” “I am against the idea of overromanticizing the matter. One time I was cleaning and then a bearded man told me
not to bend over [so that her back doesn’t show]. I felt that not because he thinks in
that way, people should do that (mish ‘ashan enta mokhak keda, lazem el-naas
te’mel keda).”

F- The Battle of the Camel, February 2
One of those days when Mona was there, she witnessed what became known as the Battle of
the Camel, when supporters of Mubarak, riding on camels and horses, stormed the Square. This was

followed by an exchange of rock throwing and a gun battle between supporters and opponents of
Mubarak. Mona narrated what she saw:
“The street that leads to Kasr El Nil Bridge, there is a triangle there, I was standing
near that spot. Then, they started to say that there are people entering [the square]
and then suddenly we started to see rocks flying like birds. People started to run and
they started to break bricks, and I didn’t know if it was right for me to break the
bricks or what to do... I stood with the women who were chanting (she laughs) and I
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started to chant with them... I remember that moment when our people pushed the
others off the horses and took the horse and tied it beside us. It was absolutely like
Wa-Islamaah!6. [They were like] “Allah Akbar! [We both laugh]. We started
jumping up and down. I remember that while I was chanting, I kept crying because I
felt pity for the people. And then I remember meeting my brother [by coincidence]
and I kept arguing with him and telling him to leave because my brother is younger
than me... molotov cocktails started to be thrown around the area of the entrances [to
the square] and so on. It was a complete mess (el-donia kanet habal tamaman).... my
mother called me and told me ‘please come back [home]’... I remember the guilt I
felt when I left. I left at the time of the Maghreb (dusk) prayer... we were leaving...
and some veiled girls [inside the Omar Makram Mosque] kept telling us ‘Come in!
Come in! Take shelter in the mosque!’ and we told them ‘no’. I felt very guilty that
we told them ‘no’.”
“I did not see any camels at all. I saw horses. I don’t know why the camel did not
pass in front of me. They got the horse and put it beside us. It was a white horse. I
remember it... There were only women where I was standing. Women chanting.
Women breaking bricks... That day, I chanted and ran, and that is it. And cried.
That’s what I did. Of course, it was horrifying (mokheef).”

G- The ouster, February 11
On the Friday following a speech by Mubarak in which he, contrary to protesters’ and
political analysts’ expectation, refused to bow to demands that he step down, thousands of
protesters decided to head to his presidential palace in Heliopolis. Mona and her mother were
among these. They spent the whole morning of February 11 standing outside the palace. Security
forces were trying to make them clear the area, but her mother, seated on the ground holding the
hands of two other women, refused to go away until news broke out that Mubarak resigned. “Once
we learnt [that Mubarak had stepped down], we gave each other hugs and we bowed in prayer of
thanks to God (sagadna),” Mona recalled. “Everyone decided to go to Tahrir. “To Tahrir! To
Tahrir!” We decided to walk there but I finally got into a cab. I was walking on the streets ululating
and people were recording the sound of my ululations.”
Essam also experienced such moment of celebration. He narrated:
“On Thursday before the address, I was very pessimistic... and when he didn’t step
down, I was seized by terrible disappointment... the next day, Friday... my mother
called me to tell me that the president stepped down. I went out to the street and
started swearing [at him]. I ran, I wanted to reach Tahrir by any means... in Tahrir,
6

She is referring to “Oh Islam!” an Egyptian film made in the early 1960s directed by Enrico Bomba and Andrew
Marton. She was describing the scene of horses after the fight, which she was likening to scenes from the film.
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we were standing and chanting ‘Raise your head high! You’re Egyptian!”... I felt
that the clichés that were being said at the time--that for the first time we feel that the
country is ours--are true.”

Mo was not able to join the Tahrir Square protests until February 11. He had initially
decided to join the protests on January 28 after the Friday prayers until his father, who works at the
Egyptian Interior Ministry, intervened. He recounted:
“[My father] told her [my mother]: ‘please do not let Mo go out because we have
orders to fire shots.. So I was grounded... [then] there was the security vacuum, and
we started to protect our neighborhoods. Because I was the only old male son, I had
to stay in the street, so I was not able to go to the square... [After the Battle of the
Camel], my thoughts were distorted, but when I went to work and started to really
follow what was happening.... I realized that we are living through a revolution and
not only demonstrations... [Mo finally made it to the streets just in time to celebrate
the breaking news of Mubarak’s stepping down. He heard the address on Egyptian
state television transmitted through his smart phone]... When I heard the news of the
ouster, I screamed in the square... I started to swear at him [Mubarak] of course. I
reacted strongly. My friend kept crying and I told him ‘It’s over! He [Mubarak] went
to hell’ (ghaar fee dahya).”

Meanwhile in Aswan, Ahmed was witnessing similar events. He remembered:
“On February 11, when we were marching [in the streets of Aswan], we passed the
building of the state security and people started to chant against them while others
were surrounding it [to protect it from attacks]. Then as we passed the police station,
people whose relatives were held inside started to attack it with rocks. Clashes broke
out and there were attacks, and one of those standing in front of the police station
was martyred. In Upper Egypt, people own land and like to possess weapons. So
when that person was martyred, people said that they have to take revenge....but God
willed that the president step down. So people started to rejoice [so the revenge
attack was averted]. They started firing live rounds in the streets [in celebration].”

IV- Analysis of the Stories
In the previous section, participants narrated how the events of the 18 days unfolded,
focusing on what constituted for them moments of significance. In so doing, they reflected on the
nature and the characteristics of the protests and the sit-in and on their role as participating subjects
shaping those events and being shaped by them. The main three themes about the 18 days that
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recurred in the participants’ narratives were: the novelty of the event, how peaceful or not the
protests were, and what level of co-existence prevailed within the Tahrir Square community. All the
participants acknowledged in one way or another the novelty, the unexpectedness and unplanned
nature of the protests, while the themes of peacefulness and co-existence were more of contentious
issues. Throughout the narration, the 18 days emerged as kind of a benchmark against which stories
about subsequent protests, sit-ins and clashes with the authorities were contrasted.
The novelty they all spoke about included several elements: shock, lack of planning, being
out of the ordinary, and the event being an opportunity for them to push their limits. They all
acknowledged that they were novices and inexperienced when they took to the streets for the first
time during the 18 days, mentioning instances when they did not know what to do or what to think
about the unfolding events. They referred to the unexpected numbers as they all went out thinking
the turnout would be small and scorned the security forces for not expecting such a huge turnout.
Essam, for example, used the word “first time” several times throughout his narration: it was the
first time for him to face a police vehicle, the first time to experience a revolution and a sit-in, and
the first time to see a military helicopter hovering overhead. When the authorities said they were
going to impose a curfew on January 28, he did not know what a curfew was. He used the word
shocking in a good way or sadem to describe what was happening whether at the protests or inside
the square. It was the “first time” for Noha to realize how much she loved Egypt when she saw the
flags in Tahrir Square. Mona used the word “surreal” in English to describe the scene in Tahrir
Square. Donia, who was once afraid of the police lest they arrest her and sabotage her private
business, said she identified with the oft-cited statement about “breaking the barrier of fear” after
she took to the streets on January 28. The experience of the 18 days made her stronger. She
described scenes of blood that she “never in my life could have seen this”. “One thing that I will
never forget is the scene of blood on bloody Wednesday [February 2 or the Battle of the Camel
day],” she said. “I saw an amount of bloodshed that I have never before seen in my life, and it is
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still affecting me until now. [I saw] people who are dead, someone who lost a leg, things that one
could have never expected to see in real life, only in movies.”
The idea that the protests were unplanned had a double sense in the case of Ahmed. It was
unplanned as an event in itself and it was unplanned for the participants themselves to take part in
it. “I went out [to the street] by coincidence,” Ahmed said of January 25 when he was in Zagazig,
where his hotel room overlooked Orabi Square. “I stood on the curb watching,” he said. “The words
‘Mubarak! Saudi Arabia is awaiting you!’ (Ya Mubarak ya Mubarak! El Sa’oudeyya f’intizarak!)
and ‘The people want the toppling of the regime!’ attracted me. [There were] 200 young men. I
started to interact with the revolution.” He construed the protests as a divine intervention,
attributing it partly to God’s will (iradet rabbena). Co-incidence also played a role in the case of
Donia, who did not initially intend to join the protests until she, like Ahmed, looked out of her
window. “There was no internet in the morning [of January 28],” she said. “I wanted to know what
was happening, so I looked out of the balcony early in the morning... there was nothing. You know
it was like the calm that precedes the storm... I said to myself the government and the police spoiled
it... I looked at the mosque in the street... I saw two or three people... I said to myself everyone is
afraid, nothing will happen... I felt annoyed... people will not go out, they will be afraid and nothing
will happen... this is what made me decide to take to the street, because we wanted to increase the
number of people... After the prayer ended, we started hearing a march coming from the direction
of July 26th road or somewhere close to us. We were looking out of the window seeing people
coming and the sound, and tear gas started to be fired... we saw the police standing in the middle
trying to make people gather in the middle so that they could fire on them.” She narrated how she
and her colleagues saw a policeman in civilian clothes leading protesters on to a particular spot
where police could easily fire on them. “So we went down to tell people to beware of that man...
this is one of the main things that made me go [and join the protests],” she explained.
They all acknowledged the presence of solidarity, high levels of morality and safety inside
Tahrir Square. They cited the example of food and blankets that were distributed. A contrast
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between people in Tahrir and Egyptians outside was made. Albert, for example, said that there was
something about Tahrir that made people act in a better way than they would otherwise.
Construction of each participant’s subjectivity as a revolutionary youth who belongs to a wider
collective of protesters vis-a-vis the authorities, and a clear division between “us” and “them”
emerged. It was clear in words such as “our people” that was used by Mona to describe the
protesters in Tahrir Square in their fight against the attackers on the day of the Battle of the Camel.
Essam also used “we” several times while narrating his participation. There was a sense of
community that for Noha was characterized by unconditional co-existence. Mona did acknowledge
that there was co-existence but rejected the over-romanticization of the Tahrir community.
The participants also reflected on the description of the protests as peaceful or selmeyya.
While Ahmed defended the view that the protests were peaceful, Essam and John dispelled the
myth of “selmeyya”, whereby this word is used to describe two different things. In the first sense,
Ahmed uses selmeyya to describe the protesters -- that they did not attack the police or any other
public or private properties (although there is a contradiction in his narrative and he does mention
instances when protesters do attack the police and public buildings). In the second instance, Essam
uses not-selmeyya to describe the attacks on the protesters, that they died while trying to break
through the security. Even Ahmed, who dubbed the protests peaceful, did acknowledge that the
higher ranking officers were attacked by the protesters. Regardless of the different viewpoints of the
participants, debate over the peacefulness of the protests is an important factor in shaping the
subjectivities of the protesters as being a “collective” that is under attack by the authorities or the
police. The experience of being together--even if not physically in the same place--in a situation
where they were the common target of police attacks heightens their sense of belonging to one
collective, a collective of protesters. It is this particular historical event, the Revolution, and its
narration as such--through these three themes-- that gives the participants a sense of being a
collective. In narrating this past, i.e. their participation in the protests, they were also constructing
themselves as constitutive of the collective as “political subjects” (Samaddar 2009) and as subjects
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of the Revolution after being “atomized” (Bayat 2009) individuals and subjects of humiliation by
the government (Ismail 2011). They were being transformed into subjects of the Revolution as they
were taking part in the 18 days and constructing narratives about them. The subject gave and is still
giving form to the collective, and the collective was shaped and is still shaping the subject of the
Revolution.
The participants narrated Tahrir as a site of protest where fear was broken and where they
pushed their limits. But there was also an allusion to “sites” of the Revolution beyond Tahrir Square
and other main protest sites. Participants who were not at the epicenter of the demonstrations are
also part of the larger story of the Revolution. And not being there -- why and what they did while
not being there-- is also part the story. “There” became synonymous with Tahrir. Tahrir was not
only highlighted by the media as being central in the making of “news” about the Revolution but it
was also evoked in almost every conversation about the Revolution and reference was made to
“there in Tahrir” to prove the speakers’ involvement in the Revolution. It was through this
association that “Tahrir” became synonymous with “Revolution.” While most of the stories
presented here highlight Tahrir Square--as do the local and international media and the official
government discourse--the participants did indeed challenge that. I intentionally selected a
participant who took part in the protests outside of Cairo--in Aswan and Zagazig. But participants
themselves also alluded to what was happening elsewhere, such as in the neighborhoods. By not
being at the site of the protest or the sit-in, participants were also contributing to the bigger-picture
story. John spent most of the 18 days in the hospital after he sustained injuries and fainted on
January 28, he received over a hundred rubber bullets in his body. Albert received a pellet and had
to skip almost two days without going to the Square. Although Tahrir was central in the narrative of
the participants and the collective they were referring to the locality of Tahrir, the realm of the
Revolution and revolutionary subjectivity extended beyond the edges of Tahrir.
V-Conclusion
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This chapter dealt with narratives first as a mode of representing the past and secondly as a
resource for content about how the subjects experienced the Revolution for the first time. Each
participant presented his or her version of the 18 days, with such narration being colored by his or
her own past, background, interests, desires, and affect. The narratives were constructed through the
remembering of certain details and the forgetting of others, at times intentional and at other times,
involuntary. In so doing, they partly reflected and partly diverged from the official government
narrative which they were sometimes seeking to counter or challenge through these narratives. This
was particularly clear in discussions about how peaceful the protests were. In an attempt to silence
references to “violence” perpetrated against the peaceful protesters during the January 25 protests,
the SCAF and the successive Egyptian governments have constantly stressed that the protests were
“peaceful”. The participants of this research all disagreed with this official narrative in as far as the
government sought to intentionally “forget” the use of force and violence against the protesters. In
the participants’ narration of instances where violence was used, they were also constructing
themselves as subjects of protest, subjects of history, and as part of a larger collective of
protesters/revolutionaries.
Acknowledgment of their inexperience was key in their narration, as was the alteration of
feelings of hope and despair, fear and courage. The novelty theme was central to their making as
subjects of protest in that their participation in the 18 days marked a rupture with the past and the
beginning of something new that was to continue thereafter. A statement like this “khalaas
maba’etsh akhaaf” (It’s over, I am no longer afraid) captures this particular rupture with the past.
This claim of the “end” of fear (I say claim because it might be just a statement that does not
necessarily reflect actual feelings of bravery but which is equally important) marks the “start” of a
new life through their new subjectivity that was shaped by their participation in the protests.
Following Javier Auyero, protesters’ stories, their recollections, are also crucial for the construction
of the sense of who they are, i.e., their ‘self-understanding’ or their ‘situated subjectivity’’’
(Auyero, 2002, 154). He says:
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“[N]arrative’s configuration of events over time makes them important to the
construction and maintenance of individual and collective identities” (Auyero, 2002,
154).
They constructed their subjectivity as protesters who belong to a larger collective of revolutionaries
(thowwar) or Revolution supporters whereby “us” is pitted against “them”, which includes the state
agents, the police, the regime and people who support them. The importance of these narratives is
not only in that they are representations of what happened but also in that they are part of the
present and will continue -- as a possibility and as a resource -- to shape the future.

Chapter Three
The Multiple Meanings of Protest
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Since the onset of the protests on January 25, there has been much debate on and analysis of
how this Revolution came about: Why protesters took to the streets, what demands were driving
them, what goals they sought to achieve through such action, and what they actually did on the
streets and at the protest sites. But what is missing is a focus on the subjects of protest and
Revolution and the meanings they ascribe to their demands and their participation. This chapter will
attempt to fill that gap by unpacking the multiple meanings of protest through examining
participants’ narratives about the reasons for which and the ways in which they partook in the 18
days.

I examine the protesters’ narratives about the demands and goals that drove their

participation and about the actions and activities they engaged in during that period. This chapter
examines how each participant makes sense of his or her participation in the 18 days and how this
process of sense-making is shaped by his or her personal experience.
I use Bayat’s “quiet encroachment” as a theoretical lens to make sense of how and why such
“atomized” (Bayat, 2009) middle-class youth, who were not part of any groups or associations or
political parties and who have never before engaged in “politics” per se were mobilized into joining
the January 25 protests. For the sake of analysis, I use T.H. Marshall’s framework of dividing up
citizenship rights into three categories: political, civil and social/economic. I look at how each
participant in his or her narrative gives varying or equal weight to each of these categories. The
political rights category includes demands for fair elections; the civil rights category includes
freedom of assembly and free speech and expression; and the socioeconomic category includes
improvement of the education system and elimination of severe poverty. I argue that these middleclass youth protesters were motivated by citizenship entitlements and by the realization that socioeconomic rights on the one hand and political/civil rights on the other were interlinked and
inseparable. They did feel empathy with the millions of underprivileged Egyptians, but they also
realized that even their middle class economic privileges were at risk as long as their political and
civil rights were not guaranteed. This feeling of risk partly motivated them to join collective action.
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The chapter also outlines modes of participation, describing the different forms through
which protesters engaged in the demonstration or the sit-in site and with other protesters. I examine
the different tasks and leisure activities that they carried out and that helped sustain the protests and
the making of Tahrir Square as a site of not only battles with the authorities but also a reclaimed
public space frequented by Egyptians of all walks of life. I will give examples of the different
groups and structures that emerged in the Square, examining how public space was reclaimed by
“the people” and re-ordered. I argue that the protesters took on roles that were ad-hoc and that
emerged at the spur of the moment as they responded to the exigencies of the situation whether
during the demonstrations or the two-week long sit-in in Tahrir Square. But in taking on these roles,
the participants also capitalized on their personal experiences, i.e. what they were trained to do. It
was these roles and the practices they engaged in that gave rise to new subjectivities, or “resignified” subjectivities (Keraitim and Mehrez, 2012). I observed several modes of participation
including the entertainer, the fighter and the supply manager, which I discuss in detail later in this
chapter.
For analytical purposes, I use the term “demand” and “goal” synonymously to refer to the
factors that participants say led them to join the protests. I have attempted to ask them that question
in varying forms depending on each participant and on the flow of the conversation with each one
of them. What is it about their country, or el balad as they themselves call it, that they did not like
and wanted to change that shaped their decision to join the protests? What purpose or goal do they
see this Revolution aiming to achieve? I analyze these demands by looking at their characteristics
and the factors that shaped them and why such demands are important to the participants. I look at
three levels of characteristics as described by the participants: How far they fit T.H. Marshall’s
citizenship right’s categorization (civil, political and socioeconomic), how far these demands are
personal or public or both, and whether the participants’ demands are vague/general or
clear/specific. I wish to acknowledge that there is some overlap between these categories. For
example, a demand could be both political and economic as well as public and private. The
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conceptualization of demands and goals as such provides useful framework to understand why these
participants were disgruntled with life in their country, what is it that they wanted to change, and
how this shaped their participation.
The literature on social movements and collective action helps elucidate some of the
research questions posed in this chapter, such as what drove the participants to decide to join the
protests or how the mass protests gradually gathered public support. For example, Mancur Olson’s
rational action theory highlighted the idea of cost and benefit in determining an individuals decision
to join collective action (Opp, 46), while P. Eisinger argued that political opportunities, such as
government responsiveness, impacts such individual decisions (Opp, 161-162). Charles Tilly
argued that identities are a determining factor in making individuals realize their common interest,
and thus decide to join collective action through what he calls “contentious politics” (Tilly, 59).
Even though these and other theories--a detailed mentioning of which is beyond the scope of this
thesis--give varying weight to structure and agency, their goal is to explain the phenomenon of
protest on the aggregate level--even if they study individual protesters. What I wish to clarify
through the particular focus on the perspective and the narratives of the youth is the different ways
in which each of these subjects “rationalize” and “make sense” of their experiences through
constructing meanings in a process that is informed by their affects, desires, aspirations on the one
hand and by the political and historical structure within which they act on the other. And it is
through this process that their subjectivities as protesters emerge.
I- Purpose of Participation
The January 25 protests was the first time for all of the participants in this research to join
such large-scale demonstrations, and the idea that it was their first time to protest, i.e. novelty, was
key in shaping their experience and their subjectivity as discussed in Chapter Two. Only a few of
them had previously taken part in a demonstration here or there. Albert once took part in a
demonstration led by judges in 2006 to protest attacks on demonstrators the previous year when
hundreds took to the streets on May 25 to oppose the constitutional referendum. Noha took part in a
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demonstration in solidarity with Palestinians that was organized at her university campus a few
years back. Mona joined a few protests over the killing of Khaled Saeed--an Alexandrian man who
became an icon during the January 25 protests--when she was studying in London. On April 6,
2008, Mo observed a march led by a group of youth calling for political reform and regime change
while being surrounded by security police who tried to prevent anyone else from joining them. Mo
eventually joined the march in order to understand what they were talking about. Although a few of
the participants of this research did sporadically join protests, they were not regular participants,
and they never experienced such a large-scale demonstration as the ones that took place after
January 25. So until the start of the Revolution, they were all what Bayat calls unaffiliated
“atomized” individuals (Bayat 2009). After going through the experience of the 18 days, however,
they have become regular protest participants, and some of them joined political and social change
groups as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
Since it was their first time, not all participants in this research necessarily had a clear idea
from the very first day as to why they were joining the protests. As discussed in the previous
chapter, coincidence played a role. Some of them just happened to be close to a protest site and first
joined out of curiosity and then ended up taking a larger part, like the case of Donia. And as they
continued to go to protest and sit-in sites, they started to develop clearer ideas about what kind of
demands and goals they were after or to identify with the demands raised by the other protesters.
But what was common to all of them, however, was that they harbored a general feeling of
discontent at how the country was run, with their discourse falling under three broad categories:
lack of human dignity, bad government practices, and poor socioeconomic conditions. This
discontent was experienced through encounters with the Egyptian state agents that involved random
identity checks, arrests, bribery, and the lack of personal and political freedoms or through
observation of injustices around them, such as police brutality, inequitable income levels, poverty,
and a bad educational system. Yusery Ahmed Ezbawy observed that the demands of the youth
“took on a snowball effect”, initially raising grievances about the security forces’ heavy handedness
57

and opposition to passing on power to Gamal Mubarak. These demands later grew in scale,
culminating in one big demand: overthrowing Mubarak (Ezbawy, 2011, 26). For the participants in
this research, taking part in the protests and the consequent sit-in made them gradually start to
formulate more specific ideas about what demands were most important to them. For some of them,
this became even clearer after the 18 days. That is to say that the crystallization of their demands
happened through a process of engagement with the physical site of the protest, i.e. Tahrir Square,
and with other protesters around them through conversations and debates.
In my discussions with John and Donia, for example, they both used the word “general” to
describe what demands they were after. Donia was dismayed over the situation of the country,
citing examples such as police brutality, bribery, and corruption in general, and she had initially not
intended to participate in the protests despite knowing they were scheduled to take place on January
25. So when I asked her which of the demands that were voiced back then she identified with, she
said, “toppling of the regime.” “You, as Donia, did you have any particular clear thing or demand
in mind that you took to the streets for?” I followed up. She replied:
“I don’t think so, I am trying to think. But they were all general things. I identified
with all the things that were being said, such as change, dignity, bread, freedom,
social equality. All these things were on my mind. I wasn’t after a particular thing. I
just felt that there are many things that should change. Everything that I see as
negative should change.”
One of her major concerns was “educational and cultural ignorance”, so she believed the
Revolution created an atmosphere that is conducive for such issues to be tackled by making
possible opportunities, such as forming women groups. She aspires for this Revolution to be a
conduit for the amelioration of women’s status and an opportunity for elevating the level of
education and culture (thaqafa) in Egyptian society. Donia started to observe the Square, engage in
conversations and go through certain situations that gradually made her identify with the issue of
women’s rights, especially when she found out that there was no female representation in the first
youth coalition formed during the 18 days. This is also partly an outcome of personal experience:
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Donia is a woman in her thirties, she runs a private business, and she constantly has to stand her
own ground. I will discuss this in detail later in this chapter.
Throughout their narratives, the participants articulated the different categories of demands
along the lines of Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship rights: political rights, civil rights, and
socioeconomic rights. The participants did not use the term “citizenship” or mowatana7 but
nevertheless made references to political, civil and socio-economic rights that they are supposedly
entitled to by virtue of being Egyptian and living in the Egyptian state. There were variations
among the participants in terms of the importance they give to each of these categories. However,
they all somehow recognized that all rights were interlinked. Mohammed Bamyeh observed that
during the 18 days of protests, “radical political demands were so elevated that all other grievances-including those concerning dismal economic conditions--remained subordinate to them” (Bamyeh,
Feb. 11, 2011). Although Bamyeh’s observation was made early on, it did reflect the opinion of
some of the participants of this research, such as Albert, who gave more salience to political and
civil rights than to economic demands . He joined the protests because he wanted to live “as a
human being”, which for him means being able to have a say in choosing political leaders and not
live in fear of the police or the authorities in general. “For me, the economic issue is not such a big
deal,” Albert explained. “Thank God, I have a good job with a good pay, but what I lacked was to
live like a human being, to have a say in what is happening, to be not afraid that a police officer
would do something to me.” Essam had a different take on the matter. Essam described himself as a
Trotskyist and is involved in a leftist student movement that works closely with workers. In his
narrative, he made a distinction between civil and economic demands and gave higher value to the
latter. “For me, this Revolution is for bread and social equality (rather than for civil freedoms),”
Essam said. “During the 18 days, I had hoped that the Revolution will set in motion the
establishment of a state that is built on the principle of social equality, and start solving the problem
of unemployment and minimum wage for workers...”
7

This term was used extensively by the Mubarak regime and became circulated a lot in the Egyptian media after the
Revolution. But it is not commonly used in the everyday life of Egyptians.
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Even though the participants are all middle class and urban, they did express concern for
others who are less economically fortunate, and at the same time, despite their comfortable income
levels, they saw themselves threatened by the bleak economic outlook of the country and the lack of
civil and political freedoms in it. This was articulated through a sense of empathy towards the poor
and sometimes guilt of being in a better position. There was also a sense of anxiety, such as that
expressed by Mo. He said:
“Thank God, I am in a good economic situation, I could buy a car and I live in a
good place. But what about the rest [of the population]? What about afterwards?
What if my income becomes no longer sufficient?”

Similarly, when I asked Mohamed which demands he identified with, he said:
“Social justice. Even if I personally am not affected by it, 70 percent or 80 percent of
the people are affected by it... [actually] me too, I am affected by social equality. I
came here [to Cairo] from Port Said to work because when I was working in Port
Said, I was only making 500 pounds [a month].”

Along with all the participants in this research, he cited economic conditions--which he is
not necessarily directly affected by but witnesses on a daily basis--as a reason for being disgruntled
at the situation (el wade’) of the country. Noha works as an interior designer and as part of her job,
she was commissioned to draw paintings to decorate the ceilings and walls of villas and palaces of
businessmen, politicians and actors. She felt the contrast between these mansions and other luxury
residential gated communities and the other parts of Egypt, where people fight over bread and
transportation and eat from rubbish bins. Jailan, who works as an architect, shared the same
sentiment as Noha. When I asked her what was it about poverty that troubled her, she said:
“When I go to the health insurance [hospital], I see how people look and how they
are treated. I say to myself, just because I have some money, I will be able to save
myself. But what about these? There was nothing that I could do, or maybe there was
but I didn’t know. This [thought] was killing me.”

Therefore, all of the participants had encounters with social injustice and poverty, whether through
their work, such as Mona who worked in an NGO in a slum, or through merely walking down the
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street and seeing people who are less privileged than them. And it was these encounters that
haunted them and made them have empathy with people from a different class but who share the
same collective with them, that is Egypt.
Furthermore, despite their middle-class status in society, they sensed they were being
marginalized in matters related to choosing their political leadership and felt threatened by the
oppressive state apparatuses. For these middle-class participants, comfortable income level was just
not enough. Mona and Albert both mentioned how they felt they were “like cattle” being goaded by
the leaders and that they were vulnerable to harassment by the police. Albert said:
“Mixing with people from the west and foreigners, I [realized that there is] freedom
and democracy abroad. This is something that I want to have here. I won’t accept to
live like a sheep in a herd. So the problem was not so much economic as it was about
rights and freedoms.”

Mohamed, who grows a bread, said he used to be stopped for identity checks and questioned by the
police because of the way he looked. He was concerned that people were living in their country
without dignity.
Although the demands over which the participants were protesting were inspired by things
they directly experienced in their daily lives, such as widespread bribery or humiliation by state
agents, they were also able to identify with demands and grievances that have not necessarily
touched them directly but which they see around them every day, such as as police brutality and
poverty. I will call the ones that affect them directly “personal demands” and the ones that do not
affect them directly “public demands.” So a middle-class university student, such as Essam, calling
for the application of a minimum wage, is a public demand. On the other hand, when Donia calls
for the reinstitution of a quota for women in parliament, she is making a “personal” demand since it
directly emanates from her subject position in society even though if realized, it will impact a larger
segment of society, i.e. all women. I propose this distinction as an analytical tool to understand how
and why people may be calling for demands that will not necessarily have a direct positive impact
on them but is good for the society as a whole. There is also an overlap: a demand could be both
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public and personal, as in the case of Mona. Mona’s brother grows a beard and has been stopped for
questioning by the police several times, and she has lived in fear for him under the authoritarian
regime of Mubarak. This was personal. So she went out to protest for freedom and dignity. But she
also worked in community outreach program and saw for herself the extreme poverty in the slums
and was therefore also protesting for social equality. This was more of a public concern that
together with the personal one pushed her to protest. But also the personal concern, i.e. her
brother’s encounters with the police, echoes a larger concern that Mona had, which is widespread
police brutality and torture in police stations. She said:
“[I had] a general feeling [of dismay over] torture and the suppression of freedoms in
Egypt. My brother grows a beard and he is a Salafi. So all the time, you are living in
fear that any second he could be arrested. It’s not that I had my brother [directly] on
[my] mind when I took to the streets to protest... but it is one of the things that is
always making me live in fear... So it was extreme anger that made me take to the
streets.”

She went on to explain why for her civil, political and social rights are all important but for
different reasons:
“I am not poor, I have money and I make enough money to live well. So that which
represents me more is when we say [chant] ‘Freedom!’ and ‘Human Dignity!’. But
at the same time, I want those around me to live [well]. I believe that it is
unacceptable that some people live a luxurious life in mansions... Even if I live an
acceptable life, this doesn’t mean that I see it okay for some people to live like this
[well] and others to live like that [in poverty]”.

Throughout the previous narratives, the participants alluded to how their encounters with the
government involved humiliation, lack of dignity, bribery and corruption. Even though, they
themselves were not touched by extreme poverty, they observed the poor around them and felt guilt
and empathy towards them. But they just remained “passive” or “inactive” thinking that
participation in political and social change is not worthwhile. This is captured by the phrase
“mafeesh fayda fel mosharka” or “el mosharka makansh leeha lazma”, both translated as “there was
no use in participation.” However, for different reasons and under diverse conditions, they were
mobilized into action by the outbreak of January 25 during which their demands started to
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crystallize through a process of engagement with the protests. While coincidence played a role in
triggering some of the participants into action, others were motivated by a personal desire to see an
end to injustice in their country.
The participants in this research acknowledged--albeit subtly--the interconnectedness of
socio-economic and political/civil demands. They realized that economic comfort was not
everything and that their economic status is not secure as long they do not have political and civil
rights. They wanted to be treated as “human beings” and not “cattle” as some put it. It is this feeling
of discomfort, injustice or even being “at risk” that mobilized them into action to use Bayat’s idea
of “quiet encroachment” (Bayat 2009). Bayat argued that it is when the interest of the previously
quiet masses are threatened and their gains become at risk that they are mobilized into political
action and confrontation with the authorities (Bayat 2009). Similarly, these middle class youth some
how felt threatened by Mubarak’s neoliberal repressive regime, and there was no choice but to join
collective action. The main difference is that Bayat described collective action of a group of
identical people, such as street vendors, or middle-class women or youth (Bayat 2009), whereas the
case of January 25 protests brought together people from different backgrounds. However, what is
useful in his framework is that he deals with unaffiliated and “atomized” individuals, which fits
perfectly well with the case of these middle-class youth.
II- Modes of Participation
The first days of the revolution started with marches from gathering points, mainly outside
mosques and professional syndicates towards main squares, interrupted by battles with the police
and culminating in sit-ins, which were sporadically a target of attacks by opponents. Tahrir Square
was the symbolic heart of the Revolution and all major squares that saw protests and sit-ins were
dubbed Tahrir by the media. Commentators and political activists in talk shows and in newspaper
columns started to utilize that plural form, the Tahrir Squares in Egypt (mayadeen el tahrir fi masr),
to highlight what they saw as the equally important sites of protest outside of Cairo, such as El Qaid
Ibrahim square in Alexandria or El Arbaeen Square in Suez. These squares emerged as the physical
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space for interaction among the various protesters, whether those camping out in the square or those
who paid regular visits to the square, for the battles between the protesters and the authorities, and
for the occasional clashes between the protesters and their opponents, whether civilian regime
supporters or ordinary citizens or shop owners disgruntled by the protests. It was in these squares,
but not exclusively, that protesters created a physical and symbolic “community.” Within this
reclaimed public space in Tahrir, each participant played a certain role, no matter how minor it was-as minor as just being there physically to make the crowd look bigger. Mona, one of the
participants of this research, told me that one of her friends described their presence in “like ants”
filling the space. Tahrir Square, as Sahar Keraitim and Samia Mehrez argued, was about the resignification of public space and public order as well as the re-signification of collective and
individual subjectivities (Keraitim and Mehrez, 2012, 15).
Protesters pitched tents and brought in food supplies and blankets, while field hospitals were
established by volunteers and professional physicians, and even makeshift toilets were built up.
The volunteers also set up television screens, radios and internet connections and spread out
newspapers on the ground for all to see as a way of linking up the square to the outside world.
Entrances to the square, where streets branched out, were manned by male and female guards who
proudly wore hand badges labeled “Square Security.” Patriotic songs blared out of loudspeakers
and several podiums were set up for singers and poets to perform. And when the square came under
attack by regime-sponsored thugs, the protesters mobilized to protect it, setting up barricades to
prevent the attackers from entering and using rocks and stones as weapons. Geographically, the
middle circle, which is called el kahka el hadideyya or the iron bun, was mainly for sleeping and
socializing, and the edges of the square, especially facing Mohamed Mahmoud Street (which leads
to the Ministry of Interior) and Abdel Moneim Riyadh square on the other end, acted as a frontline
in confrontations with the police and regime supporters.
Throughout those 18 days, the square signified several things for the participants of this
research other than simply being a place of protest and dissent, including, as Keraitim and Mehrez
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argue, it being a carnival-like site (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012). For example, Essam said he would
observe and listen to what he called halaqaat el tanwir, which is translated in English into
“illumination sessions,” whereby a group of people would sit around in a circle and engage in
discussions about politics. Essam said he learned a lot from engaging in discussions with the leftists
he met in the square. So in this sense, the square was a place of learning. In another instance, it was
an art gallery. Jailan said she loved to go to the artists corner, which was located on the pavement in
front of KFC (which was closed then), and look at their works of art. So in a way, the square was
many things for different people at the same time. Over the course of the 18 days, the square was
transformed from being a public space controlled by the authorities to becoming the prize or the
war bounty paid for in blood of the martyrs that fell during battles with the security forces. It was
the day of January 28, 2011 that marked the major transformation of the square as the property of
the people or al-sha’b after which they rewrote its history, according to an account by Sahar
Keraitim and Samia Mehrez. As they eloquently put it:
“The battle of January 28, 2011 was the marker that transformed Midan al-Tahrir in
the collective imagination from a place of strife to a space of harmony, from a
temporary site of protest to a permanent symbol of the people’s will, from a war
zone to a liberation zone, from a physical space to a symbolic one” (Keraitim and
Mehrez, 2012, 40).

However, it was the square as a carnival or a place for festivities and the production of
humor that sustained its momentum. Keraitim and Mehrez likened the square to a mulid -- which is
formal Arabic translates into birth and is a “popular celebration of the birthday of a venerated
spiritual figure (Mehrez, 2012, 15)-- in the double sense of the word, literally as the birthplace of
freedom and as a place where the rituals of the mulid celebrations “within this revolutionary
context, acquire new politicized signification (Keraitim and Mehrez, 2012, 34). Mulids
“momentarily undo established social, gender, and class boundaries, allowing villagers and town
folks, poor and rich, young and old, men and women, to share the same public sphere” (Keraitim
and Mehrez, 2012, 44). And it was this familiarity with the ritual celebrations of mulid that drew
65

millions of Egyptians, including families, even those who have never before been to a mulid but are
familiar with it through literature and movies, and that nurtured the “Independent Republic of
Tahrir” (Keraitim and Mehrez, 2012, 35-36).
Amidst this carnivalesque atmosphere, Egyptians used one of their most precious weapons:
Humor. Jokes were written or caricatures were drawn on banners, and small funny acts were
performed in the square. The jokes developed with each political development and were shaped to
suit whatever the government would say or do. For example, state media claimed that the protesters
in Tahrir were spies and that they were receiving free KFC meals and Euros for such participation.
Shortly after that claim was made, the square was full of all kinds of ways to mock that allegation. I
saw a man wearing a blond wig and holding a banner saying he was a spy and that he was receiving
money and KFC meals for participating in the protests. Another man was walking around the
square holding a plate full of dates and offering people in the square from that plate while
sarcastically shouting “Come and get some Kentucky!” The Square, thus, became a public space
that was reclaimed through a mix of violent battles and a “quiet encroachment” by the protesters.
And in each of these different significations of the Square, participants started to take on
certain tasks and cast themselves into various roles. They did not necessarily consciously have a
concrete role in mind that they knew they had to play or were playing as it transpired from my
conversations with them. Yet they did acknowledge that they were committed to certain tasks as
part of their membership in the Tahrir community. Some had roles that are more defined than
others. While some presented themselves to me clearly as slogan chanters (hatteef sing.), others
presented themselves merely as observers, who formed a significant segment of the protest goers 8.
These roles partly depended on their experience before the 18 days and their aspirations for the
future. Jailan said her first visit to the square was more for exploration rather than anything else.
She explained:

8

This is the impression I got by observing the square and talking to different people.
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“I used to walk, look at the artists and those coming with their children. I used to
listen to what people were saying. They were so politicized... On the Friday before
Mubarak stepped down, people were praying, journalists were standing on rooftops.
I was contemplating. This is what I was doing.”

Gradually, Jailan started to make sense of why she was there, and her real involvement did not
happen until after the 18 days when she helped in the organization of the one-million man march on
May 27. Albert, for example, had wanted to engage more in collective action before the 18 days but
did not have an opportunity. The Revolution offered him that opportunity. He became a makeshift
protest leader, staging a protest in Embaba, a working class neighborhood in Greater Cairo, on
January 26 and 27 and helping draft political statements about what was happening in the Square
during the 18 days. He also became a founding member of a group calling for the achievement of
the goals of the Revolution. Depending on how long they spent in the square and through their
interactions with other protesters and with the progression of events, protesters took on clearer roles
and engaged in more structured and purposeful or goal-oriented activities that were partly in
response to the exigencies of the situation. Mona did not really have a specific role in mind, but as
the square turned to more of a living space during the camp-out that started on January 28, she
started to take on different tasks, such as sweeping the floor or contributing to the supply of food
and drinks. Through a process of engagement with the Square and the community therein, they all
developed their roles and emergent subjectivities, which were also partly an outcome of their past
experience, i.e. work experience or some particular skill they had.
Based on participant observation in the square during the 18 days and the interviews
conducted with the participants, I classified modes of participation into eight categories, with
participants possibly carrying out more than one role and/or shifting roles depending on the
situation on the ground. The categories are as such: the contemplator, who goes to the square to
observe what is happening and listen to what people are saying; the supply manager, who buys and
distributes food, drinks and covers; the fighter, who defends the square and engages in battles with
transgressors; the security guard, who stands at checkpoints around the square; the public relations
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person, who talks to skeptics and critics inside and outside the square and lobbies for the cause of
the Revolution; the entertainer, who sings or reads poetry or dances in the square to lift people’s
spirits; the activist or the politician, who hold banners, lead slogans chants and form groups; and
the nurse or the doctor, who treats anyone injured in battles with the opponents. These categories
are by no means exhaustive of the possibilities of modes of participation. I believe, however, that
they do capture a fairly wide range of activities that were taking place in the protest and sit-in sites.
When I was talking to Donia, for example, I got the impression from her narrative that she
was acting like a public relations spokeswoman for the square. She narrated:
“I used to wake up early and go [to the square] and come back home as if it was my
job. I would spend a lot of time standing from the morning until night talking to this
person and that. As I am used to talking with strangers as part my job, I had taken it
as a mission to do so [in the square], especially in the last days when people wanted
to know more [about what is happening]. I would speak to them in their language...
if someone is coming from a low-income neighborhood or someone who is a little
bit older. I was trying to make them understand and give them examples using their
own language. I was successful many times. I think that I started to help people
outside the square realize what is happening in Tahrir.”

Donia then went on to help bring together a group of women to form a group 9, which I will
elaborate on later. So it was her work experience as a woman head of business, which involves
talking to people from different walks of life, that was key in determining what kind of role she
takes on. At the same time, she realized that the Square or the Revolution needed a public relations
person or a spokeswoman to explain what was happening.
A discussion of the role of the participants is very important here since the majority of them
joined the protests as individuals rather than as part of organized groups. Understanding these roles
is essential in understanding the “re-signified subjectivities”: how these individuals carve out a
place for themselves from the grassroots level rather than in a top-down manner as in other
instances of collective action and how they situate themselves in the loose structure and
organization of the protests in an ad-hoc manner. In doing so, they were constantly reshaping the

9

I removed the name of the group to protect Donia’s anonymity.
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organization of and the signification of the Square. From the narratives of the participants, it was
clear that each settled into a different role not through a pre-devised plan. As was discussed in the
previous chapter, the protests were unplanned. They rather settled into these roles each depending
on his or her skills and depending on the situations in which they found themselves, i.e. their roles
were emerging as part of a process. For example, when Noha found herself caught up in the fighting
between the supporters and the opponents of Mubarak on February 2, she started to throw rocks.
She was, therefore, transformed into a fighter even if momentarily after which she switched back to
just being an observer.
In this process of going back and forth between roles, including the taking up of new roles
(Noha had never fought before in her life), new subjectivities emerged. These subjectivities
prepared participants to engage more in the life of the square, including joining some of the groups
that were being formed as the protests were still ongoing. This process involved networking,
dialogue and negotiation with the other participants in the Square. This on-the-ground process was
in a way transforming not only public space but also the participants’ subjectivities. It was these
“political practices” (Samaddar 2009)--of engagement of protesters with each other-- and “new
desires” (Samaddar 2009)- for a new political and social order that were giving rise to these
subjectivities. In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I will elaborate more on how these participants
emerged as “political subjects” (Samaddar 2009) through engagement in the political process that
followed the ouster of Mubarak. But part of this process of becoming “political subjects” was that
participants started to join different social and political change groups while the protests were still
ongoing, i.e. during the 18 days, as will be discussed below. The subject of Revolution was thus
constantly emerging and changing with every practice, action, or event he or she engaged in, and
along the way, was transforming the political. His or her personal trajectories and desires crisscross
with those of others and with the larger structures and processes which he or she act.
The protests that broke out on January 25 were called for by several youth and activist
groups, including the April 6 Movement, the We Are All Khaled Saeed Facebook page, the
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National Association for Change, Kefaya, and the Justice and Freedom movement. The call was
disseminated through the internet and other social media. Dina Shehata argued that in the ten years
leading up to the January 25 Revolution, these and other youth-led movements played a key role in
mobilizing a new generation of Egyptian into politics through the introduction of original tools of
mobilization, framing of a new cross-ideological political discourse and created ties between
political and social activism (Shehata, 2011, 105). Although it was these organized groups that first
called for the protests, the vast majority of participants were individuals who are not associated with
any movement or group. Yusery Ahmed Ezbawy argued that the way people were drawn into the
protests was through a snowball method, starting off with a small core of politically active youth,
who were labeled as the “Facebook youth” and ending up with a larger mass of protesters that
include marginalized citizens. That core group was able to draw in and appeal to a wider circle of
apolitical youth by raising issues that touched the latter group’s daily lives, such as rampant
corruption. The third circle, which was made up of the economically and politically squeezed
middle-class, joined in large numbers followed by the fourth circle of people who live on the
“fringe of society” (Ezbawy, 2011, 26). And as the protests persisted and continued to grow in size,
some protesters started to either join existing groups or form new groups. For example, The
Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, The Movement of the Free Egyptian, and the Federation
of Revolutionary Youth all emerged during the 18 days. Some continued to work in the year after
the 18 days and are still active until the time of writing, such as the group Albert helped found. This
group was founded in the early days of February with the aim of “completing the goals of the
revolution”. The group consists of individuals with different political ideologies, all of whom are
secular (madaneyeen as opposed to Islamists). Thus, the square was a sort of recruitment space for
various pre-existing groups and it was equally a fertile ground for the birth of new groups and
movements and re-signified subjectivities. In a way, this was the start of new “politics” of
engagement.
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When Donia heard that a coalition was being set up by youth from the square to better
coordinate action and represent the protesters, she was enthusiastic and wanted to join them until
she realized that the leadership of the group did not include a single woman even though women
have stood side by side with men all along. She spoke to a friend of hers and another acquaintance
both of whom had previous experience with joining such groups, and they were both very upset that
the coalition excluded women from its top ranks. “That is when we got the idea to form a coalition
for the female youth of the revolution... I started to pass by the tents in the square during the 18
days and ask them if they are interested in joining me and I took their contact information,” Donia
explained. She then managed to set up a group for women, and in the following biggest sit-in in
July, 2011, she pitched a tent in the Square to represent the group.
Although the primary focus of this research is on the protest and sit-in site, i.e. Tahrir
Square, I would like to make reference to other sites, where subjects were also involved in
participating in and shaping the Revolution. Even though the 18-day protests and sit-in mainly took
part in public space and it was largely about the reclaiming of public space from the oppressive
authorities, it would be naive to ignore what was happening elsewhere in the country, whether on
the peripheries of such iconic squares or in private spheres. Jessica Winegar contended that the
home, where the family’s women mostly stayed during the 18 days, was also a sphere where the
Revolution was being experienced and even shaped. The home, where day-to-day practices take
place, is an important site in that it could either support or impede social change (Winegar, 2012,
68). Winegar concluded: “Focusing only on the iconic revolutionary - and by extension, iconic
notions of revolutions - means missing the myriad, everyday ways that social transformation is
experienced, enabled and perhaps impeded, always in relationship to space, gender, and class”
(Winegar, 2012, 70).
Similarly, some of the participants in this research also contributed to the Revolution in
other sites, including the workplace, over the Internet and in their neighborhoods, mainly by
defending the cause of the Revolution through discussions on social media websites and protecting
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their residential areas as part of popular committees or el legaan el sha’beyya after police withdrew
from the streets on January 28. Mo, a 23-year-old government employee, was unable to join the
protests until a couple of hours before Mubarak stepped down. Besides being hampered by work
commitments, his father, who works for the Ministry of Interior and his mother, banned him from
leaving the house for most of the 18 days. He spent that time away from the Tahrir Square protests
engaging in “electronic warfare” and in discussions with people to defend the Revolution. As the
oldest among his siblings, he joined the popular committees in his middle-class neighborhood in
Old Cairo. Mo said:
“I would talk to people on the street, in public transport or at work. I would talk to
people who badmouth [the Revolution], they may be badmouthing [it] because of a
misunderstanding. I was trying as much as I could to defend it. I succeeded with
many people.”

Thus, these modes of participation the Revolution that extend beyond the contours of Tahrir
Square show that the collective of the “protesters” or the “revolutionaries” and the subjectivities
shaped by the Revolution are not necessarily tied to the physical location of the Square but is rather
an outcome of a shared consciousness, a shared subjectivity. That is to say, they all had selfknowledge that they were taking part in the Revolution, and in so doing, they were shaping it and
determining its outcome, even if they were not on the frontline fighting riot police or in the Square
writing manifestos. Taking into account these modes of participation also does justice to the desires
of the subjects, such as Mo, who wanted to be there physically in the Square but could not because
of constraints that go beyond him. When his parents did not allow him to go to Tahrir, he used
social media to engage in the Revolution. Here, I would like to stress the importance of “desire” in
the formation of subjectivities as Ortner argued (Ornter 2009). Desire for change, for engagement
with the affairs of their country was central to the participants’ formation as subjects of Revolution.
These desires do not emanate from within the individual but are rather shaped by their daily
experiences and their personal histories as much as by the structures within which they live. For
example, mingling with foreigners gave Albert an insight into the “freedoms” they enjoy in their
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countries. He also witnessed and read about injustices, such as police brutality in Egypt. As a result,
a desire for changing injustices in Egypt was born within him. This desire for change was central in
shaping him as a subject of Revolution.
III-Conclusion
This chapter tried to answer these questions: Why and how were these middle-class youth
mobilized and what demands were they pushing for and why? And what kind of activities were they
engaged in during protest? What did this participation mean for them? I have focused on the
meaning of protest for the different participants by analyzing their goals and demands that were
divided into three main categories--civil, political and socioeconomic--with each protester giving a
different significance to each but with an acknowledgement that they were all related. I have argued
that protesters were partly motivated by aspects of what we think of as “citizenship” although they
do not phrase it as such. They nevertheless, stressed that they were making claims for rights.
Throughout the process, their personal itineraries intersected with public concerns, giving rise to
their desire for change and mobilizing them into action. Perhaps the main slogan of the January 25
Revolution -- “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity”--best captures this link between
the public and the private, in this particular case of middle-class youth, and between the political
and the economic. Bread and social justice fall within the socio-economic demands category, while
freedom and human dignity fall within the political/civil rights category.
During the 18 days, Tahrir Square gained re-signified meanings --ranging from a battlefield
to a carnival. The occupation of Tahrir Square on the night of January 28 marked a rupture with the
past in that the protesters were able to reclaim public space from the authorities and re-order it in a
way that suits their goals and reflects a utopian society. That reclaimed public space was the site of
victory, of sacrifice, and of festivities among many other significations. In all of this, participants’
subjectivities were reformulated as they took on various roles that were ad-hoc in response to the
exigences of the moment and were informed by their previous experience. These activities and roles
were also shaped by the participants’ aspirations for the future. But most importantly, the
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experience of protest will have a longer lasting effect on the participants than just the 18 days,
which I will elaborate on in the following chapter. Their experience in the Square will thus be
extended beyond that social space of protest and into the “real” society once the 18 days were over.
And with that, further “resignified” subjectivities will emerge.

Chapter 4
Revolution as Increased Involvement
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The onset of the Revolution set in motion a process of change both on the national level, for
Egypt as a country, and on the personal level, for those who participated in its activities as well as
for others who did not take part in such activities but watched from a distance. That change is
gradually evolving and its impact is being continuously redefined. The relationship between state
and subject underwent an immediate yet not necessarily a deep-rooted transformation in that the
authority and the grip of the state on the lives of citizens has been challenged and public space that
was previously under the control of the security forces was opened up by and for the people. There
has also been a “radical transformation of the relationship between people, their bodies, and space;
a transformation that has enabled sustained mass convergence, conversation, and agency for new
publics whose access to and participation in public space has for decades been controlled by
oppressive, authoritarian regimes”, as Samia Mehrez put it (2012, 14). The experience of Tahrir had
a “dramatic, immediate, and continuing impact on Egyptians and their relationship to space (both
public and private; real and virtual)” (Mehrez, 2012, 14). “This newfound power of ownership of
one’s space, one’s body, and one’s language is, in and of itself, a revolution” (Mehrez, 2012, 14).
As a result of the departure of Mubarak and the partial breakdown of his coercive security
apparatus, a free space opened up for the citizens, most remarkably the “subaltern subjects, to
reclaim their societies,” as Bayat argued (March, 3, 2011). Banned political parties came to the
light, new ones were formed, and grassroots organizations emerged as workers, farmers and
students organized to demand their rights. “These all represent popular engagement of exceptional
times. But the extraordinary sense of liberation, urge for self-realization, the dream of a new and
just points, these societies have moved far ahead of their political elites...” (Bayat, March, 3, 2011).
So after the ouster of Mubarak, one-million man demonstrations in Tahrir Square were called for to
continue the achievement of the goals of the Revolution, and labor strikes, road blockages and
government employee protests erupted exerting pressure on the government to listen to the people’s
demands. And even if government policies remained largely similar to those of the previous regime
and political elites failed to keep pace with the grassroots, state and public discourse changed, with
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terms such as “people,” “rights,” and “citizens” gaining unprecedented salience and new meanings.
At least, there was mobilization at all levels of the society.
The Revolution increased opportunities and opened up new channels particularly for youth
to engage on a wider scale in social and political change efforts and gave some of them a reason and
a cause for such engagement. They felt they have more of a say in running the affairs of their
country, especially after the experience of the popular committees when people formed
neighborhood watch groups to fill the gap left after the security forces’ disappearance from the
streets on January 28. People felt they were reclaiming their country from unjust rulers and in some
cases, they developed an emotional and physical connection with their immediate locales, such as
the neighborhood, the university and the workplace, all of which in turn emerged as important sites
for political and social action. Patterns of engagement with politics and what constitutes “politics”
and the “political” were reformulated as a result. As was the experience of protesting a novelty for
most of the protesters, so were the activities in which they took part after the 18 days, such as going
to the polls. The participants in this research did not necessarily consider taking part in the 18 days
a political act. Although they had different ideas of what constitutes the “political,” they all made a
clear distinction between “revolutionary work” and “political work.”
Engaging in “politics” has always been regarded with suspicion and distrust on the part of
the Egyptian citizens. Larbi Sadiki explained this disengagement with politics using the concept of
demokratiyaat al-khubz-- conceived by Ahmed Shalabi and akin to Edmund Burke’s “democratic
bargain.” Arab citizens show political deference to the rulers in return for subsidized social and
economic services, such as education, healthcare and employment. Under this system, politics is
“deferential and non-participatory” and contingent upon the state’s ability to provide services to its
people. As a result, people are distrustful towards their government and end up avoiding politics. A
consequence of this kind of situation is what Algerian intellectual Malik Bin Nabi called “Bulitiq”
(a bastardization of the word “politics”), which designates politics as an “undesirable game of
power, subterfuge, and counter-subterfuge; as talk but no action” (Sadiki, 2000, 79-80). “It conveys
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a general feeling of distrust, which leads to the avoidance of politics,” Sadiki explained. The term
“Khubziste”-- derived from Khubz, which means bread -- embodies this sentiment of lack of trust
towards the political system. The person’s tribe or family network offers him or her the support he
or she needs and helps him or her avoid contact with the ruling authorities (Sadiki, 2000,79-80).
Sadiki attributes this de-politicization of the Arab populace to the Arab states’ welfarist system in
the 1960s and the early 1970s, which eventually broke down and lead to the several bread riots in
Egypt in 1977 and in 1988 in Algeria (Sadiki, 2000, 81). I agree with the previous in as far as it
explains the mistrust that Egyptians felt towards “formal” or institutionalized politics. However, I
disagree that people avoided “politics” altogether. Under the neoliberal state, there were some
limited freedoms and cracks in the system that were used by the people to engage some form of
“politics” through what Bayat called a “quiet encroachment” that does not involve the institutional
channels of political parties and so on (Bayat, 2009).
According to Philip Marfleet, the successive Egyptian regimes since independence have
kept people out of national politics by using both techniques of coercion and co-optation. Whenever
there was a wave of mass protests or strikes, the regime responded by being even more repressive
than before, leading the mass of society to harbor more tense and distrustful feelings towards their
rulers. People started to feel alienated and increasingly angry in the domain of contemporary
politics and socio-cultural life (Marfleet, 2009, 15). Organized activism, Assef Bayat argued,
requires a political opportunity when the mechanisms of control exercised by the political
authorities are challenged by economic or political strife or external pressure on the regime, like for
example what happened during Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution following the assassination of then
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. But otherwise, under normal circumstances, authorities in the Middle
East have shown little tolerance towards sustained activism, forcing the political class either to quit
the political scene even if temporarily or to conduct their activities underground as the price for
being caught is too high, including torture, arrests, etc. (Bayat, 2009, 9-10). It is in this context that
we can understand the case of the Egyptians, especially youth, staying away from what they see as
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“engaging in politics,” or more generally collective political and/or social action. They abstained
from involvement in “politics” out of fear and distrust towards the regime, as the narratives of the
participants below show.
The onset of the Revolution and the participants’ partaking in it changed their conception
about joining social and political action. Albert and Jailan felt that the circumstances after the
Revolution have become more conducive to engaging in “politics,” and for them, this meant
engaging in institutional politics by joining a political party. On the other hand, someone like Noha,
still distrusts the very concept of “politics,” saying “it is not for me” and preferring to engage in
what she calls “revolutionary work,” i.e. the street protests and the awareness campaigns. So even
though, Noha still rejects involvement in the old category of “politics”, she nevertheless
acknowledges the new possibilities for involvement that were opened up thanks to her involvement
in the 18 days. What Noha still distrusts here are institutional politics--she refused to take part in the
elections or join a political party--unlike Albert, who believes it is necessary to engage in
institutional politics for the Revolution to succeed.
This chapter traces the change participants express in terms of their increased involvement
in social and political action. I discuss how participants describe and make sense of the change they
have witnessed as a result of participating in the 18 days of protests and sit-ins and what is it about
taking part in those events that shaped such change. I look at how the subjectivities of these
participants were shaped as a result of such increased involvement. The chapter describes the three
levels of change as articulated by the participants: engaging in collective action, taking part in
voting, and forming political ideas and/or identity, all of which amount to an increased interest in
engagement in political and social action. The third level describes their engagement in dialogue
about and reflexivity over ideas that are considered political, such as political ideologies and
whether they fit or not within any of the ideological trends in Egyptian politics, such as Leftist or
Liberal, and so on.
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All participants in this research acknowledged some change in at least one of these levels. In
this chapter, I argue that the 18 days triggered within the participants a new political consciousness
that drove them to want to get involved in a myriad of social and political actions, even if they
themselves do not describe it as “political.” It is political because they are making claims on their
rulers, such as fairer political representation, claims that the “Khubziste,” for example, would make.
These claims go beyond day-to-day demands, such as bread. In so doing, they are engaging in a
new way of dealing with the political, or rather they are altogether redefining the “political” through
incorporating more elements of the “political”, such as voting, into the ordinary domain. This goes
again back to the realization that political and socio-economic rights and demands are interlinked.
For the sake of analysis, I divide this chapter into three sections, each describing a level of
change articulated by participants. But this is not to say that these levels are separate. On the
contrary, it is clear through participants’ narratives that these three levels overlap and emerge
simultaneously. In addition, there are elements of continuity that permeate such change, and
furthermore, change in some aspects is not inevitable. Just as the 18 days resulted in some change in
the participants’ perspectives, it undoubtedly--as some have testified--left other aspects unchanged.
It is also important not to fall into the trap of attributing to the Revolution every change that
participants acknowledge. Any change could rarely ever be explained only by linking it to the
Revolution through a simple cause and effect formula. Change occurs through the coming together
of a myriad of factors rather than one and is non-linear, and sometimes contradictory and
unintended. Still, the Revolution is a key factor in bringing about the change described in this
chapter. All participants in this research stated that their participation in the Revolution was key in
driving them to participate in social and political action following the ouster of Mubarak and it was
key in determining their selection of vehicles for such engagement. As a result of one or more
aspect of the 18 days, they all became more interested in the affairs of their country and they all
became active in engaging in them . They have become regular participants of protests, with some
joining a political party or a group, while others remaining independent actors.
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I- Engaging in Collective Action
After Mubarak stepped down, participants in this research continued to participate in
protests, rallies, sit-ins or political awareness or electoral campaigns after the 18 days as opposed to
before when they never participated in such events. Additionally, some of them became part of an
organized group that works for social and/or political change or became members of a political
party, while others remained independent. With all of them professing to varying degrees of
increased interest in engaging in collective action, some are still skeptical of institutional politics,
i.e. joining political parties, and of the whole concept of politics and prefer to identify what they do
as “engagement in the Revolution” or “revolutionary work.” Some changed their perception about
the effectiveness of working towards political and social transformation and the means through
which they could effect such change. Rather than just participating in charity work or development
work, now new vehicles of change opened up and participants have become more enthusiastic about
them. Mona, for example, was previously engaged in development work through an NGO, while
Jailan was involved in some charity work. Most of the participants in this research had said they
would have never imagined going to a protest or joining a political party or an organized group
before January 25, so the Revolution helped extend the realm of the possible for them. Many were
uninterested in social and political action, partly because they saw no possible channels for or
potential outcome from engaging in such action under the former regime’s authoritarian grip.
Therefore, the 18 days and the stepping down of Mubarak symbolically and logistically marked a
rupture in that it changed the youth’s thinking about possibilities for and the effectiveness of
engaging in such activities and in that it opened up actual channels for such participation, such as
the newly formed groups and political parties.
This section traces the change they have witnessed, through outlining the various social and
political activities research participants have engaged in and the groups they have joined and how
their choice of such activities and groups has emerged as a result (or not) of their participation in
the 18 days. The particular political and social activities that are lumped under the term collective
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action here include: awareness campaigns, protests, sit-ins, marches and rallies, and electoral
campaigns. Following the military attacks on protesters outside parliament, activists started
organizing anti-military marches known as part of the Kazeboun or Liars campaign10. Some were
also engaged in electoral campaigns and marches in solidarity with martyrs of the Revolution. This
section will also attempt at understanding whether and how locales, such as the university, the
neighborhood, and the workplace, rather than just the main squares, downtown sties and areas
surrounding government buildings, are becoming important sites of political and social collective
action, and how participants navigate these different sites.
Seven out of the ten participants in the core sample of this research were part of either an
organized group or a political party throughout the duration of this research. Three of the
participants engaged in political and social action as “independents” or mostaqelleen (sing.
mostaqel), with one of them, Mo, joining the presidential campaign of human rights lawyer Khaled
Ali and another, John, helping out in campaigns organized by different groups, such as April 6
Youth Movement. Ahmed only participated in protests and attended meetings of several groups,
without becoming a member of any of them. The issues around which they mobilized ranged from
women’s empowerment to supporting workers’ strikes. Some of the participants said they already
had the seeds of those interests before the Revolution, and after that, these interests were
consolidated. For others, it was their participation in the Revolution that was key in determining the
type of activities they engaged in after February 11. Participants’ awareness, political and
otherwise, has been increased as a result of taking part in the Revolution and some of them see a
new role for themselves: they want to pass that experience onto others through engaging in such
activities.

10

After a series of attacks by military soldiers on protesters outside parliament and in Tahrir Square in early December,
activists launched the Kazeboun campaign to expose the violations committed by the army. This campaign included
organizing marches in residential areas and showing footage of the attacks on makeshift screens in public places.
Dozens of people were either killed or wounded in the attacks for which the army never took responsibility. The
military has until this day denied any links to these attacks.
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The 18 days were determinant in giving participants the drive to join collective action and
for some, the choice of activities they engaged in or groups they joined emerged directly out of their
experience in the Square. Such was the case for Jailan and Albert. On her numerous visits to Tahrir
Square during and after the 18 days, Jailan became friends with people who started to campaign for
the then a newly formed party. She started looking for a suitable vehicle through which to engage in
social and political action, and for her, the most important aspect of this was engaging in campaigns
to raise people’s awareness. Believing that joining a party was the best way to do so, Jailan finally
made the decision to join a party. Albert never thought about joining any group before the onset of
the Revolution. “It did not make sense before the Revolution. But after that, space opened up for
taking action and taking action actually results in change... before that, protesting never changed
anything, there was no use before,” he explained. And he has a clear idea of why the political party
is the best vehicle for action. “In the time being, nothing could be achieved through individual
effort. You need a huge effort. The more organized and unified that effort is, the more it will bear
fruit,” he explains. He believes that best vehicle for carrying that out is through a political party.
“What’s important for Egypt now is that there should be a continuity in work that is organized over
a long period of time. That is why a political party is important,” Albert said.
Others like Noha and Mohamed chose not to join political parties, but rather other
organized groups whose goals are directly linked to the Revolution: The Second Revolution of
Rage11 and Masrena12 respectively. The aim of those two groups is to continue the achievement of
the goals of the Revolution. This is different from political parties, whose existence does not depend
solely on the state of a continuing revolution and whose participants join them for the achievement
of objectives that transcend those of the Revolution, such as power sharing or state policy change.
Noha said:

11

The group started as a Facebook page that drew in people interested in working on raising political awareness
through organizing debates in public squares. I once witnessed a public debate organized by the group in the downtown
Talaat Harb Square, where they engaged with passersby in political discussions.
12
The group was founded by several activists, including Wael Ghonim, to continue the goals of the Revolution.
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“I never thought that one day I would join a movement. This was unimaginable for
me. I joined the Second Revolution of Rage’s page on Facebook because since its
inception and its call for the May 27 protest, they are the ones that are really working
on the ground. They don’t stay in closed circles and they don’t make political deals
with others....these are the ones who really want to make the Revolution succeed.
Their goal is to make the Revolution succeed and after that the movement will be
dismantled.”

Similarly, Mohamed chose to join Masrena in order to contribute to the achievement of the
goals of the Revolution. He is a founding member of the group, and he calls his participation
“revolutionary activities,” which includes organizing protests and rallies. He was involved in
organizing Salasel El Thawra13, a campaign where participants stand on the sidewalks or in any
public place holding up banners with a specific message the aim of which is to trigger discussion
with passersby, and in so doing, partly increasing awareness about certain issues related to the
Revolution.
John and Mo refused altogether to join either type of group, opting instead to be independent
actors joining collective action as they see fit. While acknowledging that the 18 days were key in
determining which activities they pursued afterwards or which groups they joined, participants
showed flexibility and willingness to jump from one group to another depending on circumstances
in a way that best serves their objectives and gives them meaning. After the 18 days, Mona joined a
political party and a youth group, and said that if any of these groups become defunct, she would
move to find other conduits for political and social action. “One should try all the time, and if
something dies out, one should direct one’s effort to something else, I keep trying,” she said.
One important aspect that emerged in the wake of the Revolution is the growing importance
of the peripheries and localities, such as neighborhoods and universities, vis-à-vis the core of the
city and the country as a whole, as sites of protests. The expansion of the space in which acts of
protest take place was happening in tandem with the increase in the core of active protest
participants. Some participants in this research displayed such a pattern of increased engagement in

13

Salasel literally translates into chains and in this context human chains which participants form.
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their locales. Noha and Albert, for example, have separately as part of their respective groups
organized marches in the neighborhood of Shobra. Essam, a student at a private foreign university,
is also a case in point. In the few months after Mubarak stepped down, he came together with a
group of like-minded Leftist students to form the university’s first Leftist group. And since then,
they have been involved in organizing small student rallies and sit-ins in solidarity with workers in
their struggle for better working conditions. Essam said he believes that the Revolution should
permeate institutions (el mo’assassaat) such as factories or the universities, rather than remain
solely on the streets. When I asked him if he was planning to join a protest in April, 2012 in Tahrir
Square, he replied that he preferred to take part in supporting strikes and protests on his campus
than join protests outside his university, at least at that time.
As a result of taking part in the 18 days, the notion of the “collective” itself gained new
significance as participants were in contact with other protesters and developed a sense of common
goal and belonging. After the ouster of Mubarak, participants continued the practices of the 18
days, such as the protesting, the rallying, the writing of political statements, and so on. It was
through these practices that the ethos of the 18 days remained alive not only in the main protest
sites, such as Tahrir Square, but also in other localities, such as the university and the residential
neighborhoods. It was also through these practices that their subjectivities as protesters were being
reinforced. Because of the partial success of the January 25 Revolution, i.e. the ouster of Mubarak,
the participants realized that taking part in collective action is indeed useful and worthwhile. This
was clear in their narratives because whenever they talked about protests that took place after the
ouster of Mubarak, they often harked back to examples from the 18 days.
II- Voting
Elections gained new salience after the Revolution as the authorities in charge of running the
country, namely the SCAF and the Cabinet, urged “the people” and the “citizens” to go to the polls
and make their political choices. The eligibility of Egyptians to vote in what were labeled as free
and transparent polls was portrayed as one of the grains of the January 25 Revolution. Egyptians
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living abroad gained the right to vote for the first time in history after a long legal and political
battle. The legislative elections that took place from November 2011 until March 2012 were
described as the “the ceremony of democracy” or “ors el demokrateyya” as if it were the
continuation and the culmination of a democratic process that started with the January 25 protests,
according to the official narrative of the ruling authorities. But this view did not resonate well with
individuals and groups that were still active in organizing street protests and that were generally
dissatisfied with the way the transitional period was proceeding.
While the state’s official view was that the Revolution had concluded and its goals were
accomplished, giving way to a political process at the heart of which were the elections, activists
and individuals identifying themselves as “revolutionaries” rejected such a narrative, believing
instead that the struggle for the goals of the Revolution was ongoing. Furthermore, the legislative
elections, which started on November 28, came in the wake of clashes between police and
protesters near the vicinity of the interior ministry during which dozens were killed or injured. As a
result, some of those who participated in the January 25 Revolution decided to boycott the
elections. Others, however, opted to go along with the existing conditions and make their voices
heard through their voting choices in the parliamentary and later presidential elections.
This section is dedicated to understanding how the 18 days changed, if at all, participants’
perception of their participation in voting, possibly as a manifestation of increased interest in
politics and political engagement and in effecting political and social change in their country and
how they make sense of their electoral choices, including boycotting the poll. I look at how some
use the event of the Revolution in their narratives as a justification or a pretext for going to the polls
or boycotting them and how, their experience during the 18 days of the Revolution and its aftermath
shaped their ideas about voting.
During the course of this research, Egypt witnessed a constitutional referendum in March
2011, legislative elections from November 2011 until March 2012, and presidential elections in
May and June 2012. The political and historical context in which the referendum took place was
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very different from the following two elections. It took place one month after the ouster of Mubarak
when the clout of the SCAF has not yet been established and before the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamists gained political power. The parliamentary elections, however, took place shortly
after and during battles between protesters dismayed by the transitional period and the security
apparatus, represented by the security forces or the military police.
Most of the participants in this research said they have never voted in any elections before
the Revolution and one participant, Mona, had intended to vote in the parliamentary elections in
2010 but was unable to do so because she did not have a voting card. All of the participants in this
research went to vote in the March 2011 Referendum, but not all of them went for the parliamentary
and presidential elections. Most of them did not completely buy into the state’s official line that the
elections were truly democratic, with some acknowledging some improvement compared with the
elections under the former regime. They, nevertheless, seized the opportunity to become
participants rather than observers, an opportunity that was born thanks to the Revolution regardless
of their misgivings about the circumstances under which the elections were conducted or about the
electoral process and the candidates. At least two participants, Mona and Jailan, even regretted that
they had not participated in previous elections, saying had they been more pro-active in the past,
change may have come earlier. Participants acknowledged that their voting choices change with the
circumstances and were largely affected by the political circumstances at the time.
Mona and Jailan both believed in the importance of voting after January 25. Jailan, who has
never voted before in her life because she did not find any candidates that represented her, said that
going to vote was now a “duty.” She said:
“[Before], the ruling regime had everything. You only had two camps: the ruling
regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Revolution, that was completely
changed... there were so many lectures [about the referendum], and I thought I must
know that if I were to vote with yes or no, I had to know why I was doing that.... So I
attended so many lectures that presented analysis... I was making a lot of effort...
during the run-up to the referendum, I felt that we were studying for an exam that we
had to pass... it was my first experience with elections and it affected me a lot... after
that [I went to vote in] the parliamentary and Shura Council elections.”
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She said she blamed herself for not getting involved in general earlier. “Why did we not
interact with them [the activists who were calling for change]. The Revolution could have come
earlier and the country could have been better now... I was very happy [with the elections] although
that results were all negative. I am not really convinced with this parliament but as a start, that’s
fine.” I asked her if the Revolution made her change her mind about voting. She said “of course, it
made me go out and vote.” Mona reflection’s are similar to Jailan’s. She said:
“[After the Revolution], I got a feeling of guilt because before the Revolution-during the 2010 parliamentary elections-- , we kept on saying that we will not take
part in this farce [the 2010 parliamentary elections]... after that I started to realize
that it is possible to achieve something when we are a lot and how come we never
did that before. If everyone of us had went [to vote], they wouldn’t have been able to
rig the elections in this flagrant (safla) manner.”

Like Mona, Mo spoke about his choice to go to the polls in a pragmatic way. Mona said that
calls to boycott the parliamentary elections so as to render the elected parliament illegitimate were
unrealistic, and it was more important for her to cast her ballot in order to help limit the electoral
gains of the remnants of the former regime (foloul) and Islamists. Mo also said he went to the polls
to curtail the influence of Islamist parties. Albert, who campaigned for candidates of his party [The
Egyptian Social Democratic Party] but did not vote, said he participated in the elections as a
campaigner not because he believed they were transparent and democratic, but because he saw it as
a learning opportunity for future election experience. “If we want a democratic future and I want to
work in politics, I have to go through this experience to see on the ground what an election
campaign is and how monitoring and vote counting are done, and I had to see it with my eyes,”
Albert said.
For Mohamed, voting was a continuation of the process of the Revolution: the 18 days of
protests resulted in the dismantling of the upper and lower houses of parliament, so it’s his duty to
go to the polls in order to bring those institutions back into function. He said:
“I tell people that participation in voting after the Revolution is like eating and
drinking. Some would tell you that [voting] is a political activity (nashat seyassi). (I
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say) that is not a political activity. Voting should be for normal human beings...for
people in developed countries, that is normal.”

Here then, Mohamed does not see voting as part of el seyassa or politics, from which he
distanced himself not because he was necessarily against it--as in the case of Noha, who openly said
she does not want to get involved in politics--but because he was not qualified for engagement in
politics. So voting in that sense is part of the normal everyday life domain.
Despite the huge state campaign urging people to vote, some chose to boycott. Many of
those who boycotted have been heavily involved in protests and have witnessed violence
perpetrated by the security forces firsthand in what was known as the Mohamed Mahmoud Battles
and the Cabinet sit-in in which dozens were killed and wounded. Noha, who had never voted before
the January 25 Revolution, said she boycotted the parliamentary elections that started on November
28 because she did not sense that the elections would be transparent after she realized that the
committee overseeing the elections was headed by the same judge that oversaw the rigged 2010
elections. John also expressed a similar distrust of the elections calling them a “farce,” the same
terms that were used to describe elections under the previous regime. “When I find that the judicial
committee overseeing the elections is independent and respectable, yes for sure, I will go and vote.
But these elections, I will boycott,” Noha concluded.
Although the above narratives were infused with misgivings about the conditions under
which the elections were held, they showed a shift in the participants’ willingness to engage with
elections as opposed to before the 18 days when going to the polls was completely unimaginable or
viewed as entirely useless. Despite exhibiting some skepticism about the transparency of the poll,
they said they are more optimistic and willing to vote in future elections when the circumstances are
better, like for example, with the selection of an Election Commission with integrity. The meaning
of voting was different for each one of them. While Noha viewed voting in the context of the
parliamentary elections as a betrayal of the goals of the Revolution, Albert and Mona, saw it as a
means to continue the process of change that the Revolution started. At least there are no more
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state- or ruling party-orchestrated attacks on opposition voters or widespread open rigging. So the
participants in this research did not necessarily change their view about the effectiveness of voting
nor did they necessarily see it as a “political” act. However, new dynamics emerged, wherein voting
is viewed as “normal” and as an option among many possibilities available to effect the change they
want to see in their country. But at least, there was an initial acceptance of the effectiveness of
going to the polls: they all went to vote in the March Referendum fresh with euphoria resulting
from Mubarak’s departure. The idea that change could be effected through the ballot box gained
more legitimacy in the eyes of the participants because of the onset of the Revolution. For those
who did vote, they were emerging as subjects of politics as their subjectivity was being shaped by
that very practice of voting. But even those who did not vote, the very practice of engagement in the
voting process--by rejecting it and challenging its validity--was a condition giving rise to their
political subjectivity.
III- Forming Political Views
Organizers of the protests and the sit-ins of January 25 stressed that people participating in
such events did so as “individuals” or as “Egyptians” rather than as members of their political
parties or groups or members of their religious communities. Whether Islamists, Leftists,
Nationalists, Muslims, Christians or others, participants should put all their differences aside for the
sake of Egypt, according to the organizers and the participants. To use Bayat’s words, they were
“atomized” unaffiliated individuals (Bayat 2009). Nevertheless, the two-week sit-in in Tahrir
Square and the events that took place over the next year and a half turned out to be fertile ground
for Egyptians to gain exposure to different political ideas and ideologies, engage in deep
discussions about them, and for some, even embrace some of those ideas and formulate what could
be described as a “political identity.” The Revolution expanded the space dedicated to discussions
of “politics” whether in the media, among family and friends or on the streets. The Revolution
provided a physical space (in the squares and the venues where people came together to protest) in
addition to creating a general historical, social and political context where discussions about politics
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became the norm. After Islamists made gains in the political field, especially after winning a
majority of the seats in the now defunct parliament, a schism occurred between what became
popularized as “the secularists” and “the Islamists”, and as I am writing, this the gap is growing
even wider. After the 18 days and in tandem with the changes that were taking place on the political
scene with regards to the salience of ideologies, participants in this research started to formulate
their views. This section examines how participation in the Revolution impacted participants’
political views and helped some formulate or consolidate their political ideology, as well as how
participants’ experiences before the Revolution helped shape this process.
The extent to which the Revolution helped shape participants’ political ideas and identities
varied, but all participants acknowledged that the 18 days and their aftermath with their different
facets were definitely seminal in increasing their political awareness and giving clearer shape to
their political views. Mo and Albert both started to read more about politics and about the
experiences of other countries. The significance and relevance of political ideology to the different
participants also differed. For some of them, it seemed important to have a clearly defined political
identity, while for others it mattered less. Albert and Mo stated clearly that they were Social
Democrats or belonged to such a party; Jailan joined the Social Democratic party; Mona described
herself as a “leftist;” Noha said she preferred Socialism; and Essam described himself as a
Trotskyist. Ahmed, Mohamed and John said they did not subscribe to any ideology.
The process of formulating political views during and after the 18 days was no doubt
affected by their experiences prior to the 18 days, including factors, such as their academic
experience and the influence of their parents and friends For Mona and Essam, the period of the 18
days was rather an experience that helped them consolidate ideas and beliefs they are already had
before but thanks to the Revolution had become clearer. Mona had been exposed to Leftist ideas
through her professors when she was studying at a Leftist institution in the UK. She had given this
issue some thought but never too seriously until one day during the sit-in in Tahrir Square when one
of her friends came up to her to ask her about her political ideology. It was then that she started to
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seriously think about her political identity and realized that her ideas were closer to the Left. She
also realized that having a political ideology is only meaningful when there is scope to work in
politics, i.e. after the January 25 Revolution. She said:
“Before the Revolution, I never identified myself as being closer to the Left...I
wasn’t too concerned to see whether I am Left or Center or Right...I felt that it was
useless to try to figure that out because at the end, there was no (real) opposition, the
opposition served Mubarak’s regime, so there is no difference if you’re Right or
Center or whatever.”

A similar case is Essam’s. He had interest in and read a lot about Leftist ideas and thought
of himself as a Leftist, but he did not know which stream of Left he identified with. The 18 days
and their aftermath gave him the opportunity to meet Leftist activists and engage in discussions
with them, which helped him identify Leftist ideas he agreed with the most, thus finally finding the
what suits him the most, which is Trotskyism. After that, he went on to join the Revolutionary
Socialists and became a founding member of a Leftist student movement at his university. For
Albert, the onset of the Revolution made it necessary for him to read more about the political ideas
he believed in and to solidify his understanding of them. The Revolution highlighted the importance
of subscribing to and even made it necessary to have a political ideology, especially if one was to
work in politics (yestaghal fel seyassa), i.e. institutional politics. Albert was already convinced by
the Social Democratic ideas when the January 25 protests broke out. After the Revolution, the issue
of having a political ideology gained new importance. He said:
“Anyone who wants to work in politics should have a specific political orientation or
else [he or she] would be working in vain... one could not work without deciding
[which ideology he or she belongs to].”

However, not all research participants stated that the Revolution necessarily prompted them
to search for a specific political ideology or try to find out where they fit in the political spectrum.
But still, participation in the 18 days did help them gain exposure to and deepened their
understanding of political ideas. For Donia, subscribing to a political ideology or having a clear
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political identity is not a prerequisite for working towards political and social change. She seemed
less concerned than Essam and Albert about deciding what her political ideology is. True, she was
concerned with women’s issues, but she shied away from calling herself a Feminist, although others
see her and label her as such. She did not have enough theoretical background information about
these ideologies to decide. Donia said:
“I have a problem that since a long time ago I have not been able to label myself
(awwassaf nafsi), but after the Revolution a lot of people started to want to label
me... I have personally never thought of myself as such (as a Feminist) even until
now I do not know exactly what Feminism is.... people, journalists and women’s
movement members call me as such...they ask me since when I have been interested
in Feminism, but I don’t know what Feminism is... I do not label myself, what I
know is that I just go with my feelings and I don’t know whether what they say is
right or wrong, but they are all trying to put labels on me in different ways.”

Mohamed, who identifies himself as a Salafi, said the Revolution opened up horizons for
him and made him learn more about Socialism and Liberalism. However, the question of embracing
a particular political ideology is irrelevant. He is not in need of a political ideology as, according to
his beliefs, the political domain is not separate from the religious domain. Religion has answers and
is the framework for everything: economics, judiciary, politics, inheritance law, etc. He said:
“As a Muslim who adheres to his religion, there is no separation between religion
and politics; my belief in political ideas is part of my religion... I do not need to
subscribe to political orientations... why should I subscribe to liberalism or leftism.”

But he also said it was important to know how other people think and try to understand
them. According to John, there is no need for a set or clearly defined political ideology. “I am more
of a leftist... but I don’t believe in ideologies...I take from all ideologies and leave some things out
of them too,” John said. When I met him for the second interview I asked him again, he replied:
“The idea of labels, I never care much about it... I never define myself as X or Y or Z...”
The participants in this research, therefore, viewed the 18 days as a learning opportunity
during which they were exposed to different political ideas and people belonging to different
political ideologies. Therefore, it was an opportunity for them to reflect on their own political view
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and their political identity in some cases as well as reflect on the meaning and importance of
politics altogether. For some, it was an opportunity to even embrace some of the ideas they were
exposed to, especially that all of them planned to continue to work towards social and political
change after the ouster of Mubarak. The new political subjectivities emerging were shaped by these
political debates amongst protesters and their own internal reflections on these issues. They were
witnessing a historical moment that imposed new exigencies, including the need to think about what
political views they believed in, with the talk about politics proliferating the streets and the media.
IV- Conclusion
The 18 days marked a rupture and an exceptional historical moment that created the
conducive atmosphere that made a lot of people, including the youth in this research, want to be
part of the social and political change that was expected to follow the ouster of Mubarak. But these
opportunities and spaces that opened up were not granted by the regime as a gift to the people but
these were spaces and opportunities that were gained through a struggle and the collective action of
the youth and other protesters. Gains, such as freer and more transparent elections, the relaxing of
political party formation rules, were only possible through the contentious actions of the protesters.
These gains in turn expanded the realm of the possible for these participants. Whereas before they
never imagined taking part in social and political action, they now engaged in collective action,
voting and negotiation of their political views and identities. This chapter showed that such change
in “practices” of the participants is constitutive of their political subjectivity.
By outlining the various forms through which the participants became more engaged in their
social and political setting, including joining political parties, going to the polls for the first time in
their lives and being regular participants in street protests, this chapter showed that what constitutes
the “political” for the participants has been reshaped as a result of the experience of the 18 days.
But what constitutes “politics” and the “political” differs among them. For example, Noha sees
voting as part of the formal political process that she rejects, while Mohamed sees it as a normal
part of his life after the Revolution. But for Mohamed, there is no separate political realm since it is
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included in the religious domain. Participants did make a distinction between Revolution and
politics, and that each has a separate itinerary. However, for some, in order for the Revolution to
succeed, one has to get engaged in politics. It now became “normal” for them to participate in the
elections or take part in protests. It might not necessarily be that these participants have become
politicized or political. Rather, what constitutes the normal or the ordinary or the mundane has
become infused with the political, it has become politicized. A process of normalization of
“politics” was at work.

Chapter 5
Reclaiming El Balad and the Emergence of the “Active” Political Subject
Over the past twenty years, the prevalence of neoliberal policies and political repression has
caused a large segment of Egyptians to become disenchanted with living in their country. Groups
such as youth and low-income earners have been increasingly marginalized by the government in
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socio-economic and political matters and excluded from the decision-making process that directly
affects their lives. On a personal level, many Egyptians lamented what they felt was a weakened
sense of belonging to the collective of Egypt, evident in statements such as “I do not feel part of this
country” (ana mish hassess enni goz’ men el balad dih) or “I do not belong to this country” (ana
mabantameesh lel balad dih). This weakened sense of belonging to the “collective” led them to
withdraw even more from or take every opportunity to avoid encounters with government agents
after realizing the hollowness of the promises of the provision of rights in exchange for duties,
which has been the rhetoric of the modern Egyptian state. As was shown in Chapter One, the term
“citizen” was rendered obsolete by a state that was ambiguous in dealing with its subjects. This
ambiguity was reflect in the state being present only as a coercer and a violator of rights and not as
a service provider or an upholder of citizenship rights. As a result, Egyptians’ relationship to the
collective of Egypt el balad--as Egyptians, including participants of this research refer to it--became
strained. For them, el balad evoked humiliation, lack of dignity, police brutality, social injustice,
oppression, corruption, random identity checks, lack of political representation, etc.
The concept of el balad recurred in the narratives of the participants, and many of the rights
for which they were making claims and their aspirations for their future were framed with reference
to el balad. El balad is used by Egyptians in multiple contexts to denote a myriad of meanings,
including the physical territory or the people of Egypt. But more importantly, the word has been
widely used during and after the 18 days in the media and by the government to shape the discourse
about the Revolution through statements such as el balad kherbet (the country has been destroyed),
kharbeen el balad (they are destroying the country) were used to discredit the January 25 protesters,
while statements such as el balad beta’etna (the country is ours), hannadaf el balad (we will clean
the country) were employed by those who took part in the protests. The words el hokouma, the
government, el dawla, the state, and el nizam, the regime, have also been used in juxtaposition to el
balad. The importance of el balad in the context of the Revolution and this research is that it is used
by the participants to denote a certain collective within which they lived and under which their
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subjectivities have been conditioned by oppression, humiliation, marginalization, exclusion, and
oppression before the Revolution. And this conception of belonging to that collective shaped their
experience of participation in the Revolution and their political subjectivity.
“Belonging” is generally a rather slippery term, and it is seldom used on its own. Versions
commonly used are “national belonging” and “social belonging,” both of which are used in studies
of immigrants and citizenship as is the case in Christina M. Getrich’s article on second-generation
Mexican youth protests in 2006 (Getrich, 2008). In Arabic, the word is translated as intimaa. I will
use it here to describe how far the participants feel they are members of the collective of Egypt. The
onset of the January 25 Revolution did not necessarily change Egyptians’ sense of belonging to the
collective of Egypt, but it did indeed make Egyptians question and reflect on their previously held
beliefs and perceptions about and feelings towards the collective of Egypt, or el balad, and their
role in it. The Revolution and its partial success--at least in toppling Mubarak--gave those who
participated in it a sense of regaining el balad as if they won it back from unjust rulers. The claim of
“regaining the country” was evident in the narratives of the participants of this research. It also
transpired through messages dabbed on city walls, circulated by e-mail or mobile phones, or written
on car bumper stickers, urging Egyptians to “protect their country”. “Starting today, this is your
country,” read one message circulated on social media networks and via text messages. The
message contained a list of instructions warning Egyptians against throwing rubbish or paying
bribes, and so on.
In this chapter, I examine what el balad and “reclaiming the country” mean to the different
participants in the context of the Revolution, i.e. the subjects of the Revolution. I also examine the
subjectivity that was formed and produced in this context and how participants make sense of their
“new” role in it in an attempt to understand how “politics creates its subject, the subject who is not
the slave of a politics guided by others, but who authors politics” (Samaddar, 2009, xviii). In a
sense, the January 25 Revolution and its aftermath represent “contentious situation[s]” from which
its participants emerged as “political subjects”--a concept that describes what other categories, such
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as “citizen” and “political society,” fail to capture (Samaddar, 2009, xiv). It describes “all who are
most of the time in the non-citizen circumstances, for whom citizenship as a legal category makes
increasingly little sense” (Samaddar, 2009, xvii). I attempt to contribute to answering the question
of the link between the subjects’ participation in the 18 days, the reconstitution of their relationship
to el balad, and the emergence of a new political subjectivity. I argue that participants’ relationship
to the collective of Egypt was reconstituted as a result of their experience of partaking in the 18
days, whether as a result of the act of protest itself or other situations they encountered during the
Revolution. This reformulated relationship is the outcome of and is translated into new practices the
subjects of the Revolution engaged in, such as voting and joining political parties and other kinds of
political and social action groups.

The realization of being able to effect change made the

participants recognize that they are not longer just the passive receivers of whatever the regime
imposed upon them and gave rise to this new subjectivity: that they are “authoring politics” to use
Ranabir Samaddar’s words (Samaddar, 2009, xviii). It was against this reformulated relationship
with el balad that the “active political subject” emerged.
I-El Balad: Between Reality and the Utopia of Tahrir
Despite its “absence” and “softness,” the Egyptian state was very much felt through its
heavy-handed security apparatus. Fear of the state as the holder of the exclusive rights of the
legitimate use of force, which it uses arbitrarily, against its citizens was widespread not only among
those who were engaged in “political” activities but also among the disempowered citizens who are
frequent targets of the security apparatus. Random identity checks, especially for male youth, are
widespread, and torture became a state policy. That the Egyptian state, as a service provider and a
upholder of citizenship rights, is almost non-existent is not an overstatement in so many cases and
under a myriad of circumstances. Potable water and other amenities lack in so many areas, both
urban and rural, and government bureaucracy made the lives of Egyptians difficult. The provision
of basic services in many places are provided via charity or “development” campaigns by either
private corporations, such as mobile phone operator Vodafone Egypt, or civil society, including
97

local and international Non-Governmental Organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood, which until
2011 was a legally banned group. Not only did they lack those rights, but they were also subjected
to techniques of humiliation. The emergence of the subject in opposition to the government or the
state is reflected clearly in the narratives of the participants of this research, who often refer to
themselves as ihna “we” versus el hokouma or government (they use this term rather than el dawla,
which literally translates into state). They all also somehow identified with the “humiliated” subject
to which Salwa Ismail refers (Ismail 2011).
It was in this context that Tahrir--as a utopia and a reality--was born. Tahrir presented an
alternative conceptualization of how el balad could be, posing a symbolic and actual challenge to
the Egyptian state. The enclosed community of Tahrir--literally closed off by the barricades put up
by the protesters in the aftermath of the Battle of the Camel on February 2--was a reminder to its
participants and to the regime of the failure of the Egyptian state, thus undermining its already
weakening legitimacy. In the same way (as discussed in Chapter Two) that the 18 days were
constructed in the narratives of the participants as being a benchmark against which all other events
were measured, so was Tahrir constructed as this Utopian community against which the “normal”
Egyptian society was contrasted. In Tahrir, there was a different image of the “Egyptian” or
“Egyptians.” In that community, Egyptians were civilized, polite, well-mannered, cooperative, all
these terms that the participants in this research use. A glorification of the Egyptian people--who in
Mubarak-era government rhetoric were to blame for the misfortunes and ills of the country (for
example, former Prime Minister Nazif and Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali blamed
Egyptians for the high birth rates)--was at work and still is whenever a reference is made to El
Tahrir.
Throughout the 18 days in Tahrir, Albert saw the “Egyptian that I wished to see.” “I loved
the community of Tahrir, the people who were in the square who were cleaning and organizing.
There was freedom, complete freedom. Everybody respected everybody else. This was one of the
things that pleased me and that I wanted to see outside of the square,” he said. Tahrir showed its
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participants “something else,” which is contrasted to the society outside. Egyptians’ identification
with and sense of belonging to the Tahrir community offered them a glimpse of what is missing for
them to be able to feel the same way about their country as a whole. “Tahrir was a state within a
state,” retorted Mo, referring to the organizational structure of the Square that offered Egyptians
what the Egyptian state failed to offer them. Jailan had a similar view:
“I felt that I have to be in Tahrir... it was the place that will bring back my faith in
this country because of all the positive things that were happening... even after
people were brutally attacked on January 25 and 28, they still came back to the
square and the numbers increased... they believed they were doing something for the
country.”

A subjectivity revolving around the Revolution, that of el thawry, or the revolutionary, or shabab el
thawra, youth of the Revolution, also emerged as I have shown in Chapter Two and Three. The
enactment and the performance of that subjectivity took place not only in Tahrir Square, but also in
the streets surrounding it and in other localities, such as in the neighborhoods when youth joined
watch groups to guard their homes when the police disappeared on January 28 or when they were
with family, friends or acquaintances. Inside Tahrir, then, was another better version of the
Egyptian people and the Egyptian state. In the same way that a humiliated subject emerged out of
the constant encounters with the government over the past thirty years, a “revolutionary” subject
was born in Tahrir and with it was born a different and alternative imaginaire about the collective
within which the participants could live and belong to, namely el balad. In that sense, el balad was
both a bad reality that the participants wanted to change and a possibility or a dream they wanted to
achieve.
When speaking about el balad, Donia complained that ignorance was rife among Egyptians
and that the state was not paying enough attention to that domain. When she said she wanted to
make the country better, she believed she could do so through improving el thaqafa, or culture, and
ta’leem, or education. She also wanted to see the amelioration of the status of women in the
country, such as better working conditions and better representation in parliament and the
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government. It was also during the 18 days that she met Egyptians from all walks of life and
realized that there are people like her, people who want to change the country. This made her want
to work with the people on changing el balad to the better.
Mohamed said he wanted to vote for a president that will make el balad better. When I
asked him what he meant by that, he said that included its economy and institutions as well as the
moral and religious righteousness of its people. He also stressed that the country should safeguard
the dignity of its citizens. He conceptualized the relationship between citizen and country in terms
of benefit exchange, whereby the citizen should contribute to his country and his country should
give him benefits, or manafe’, in return. He stressed that the country should give its citizens a
“dignified life.” He said that Egyptians were “humiliated” in their own country: their freedoms were
being breached by the security forces, there were no employment opportunities, and they had to pay
bribes to get things done. He felt that before the Revolution he was living as a stranger in his
country as he could be randomly stopped by the police and asked for his identity card just because
he grows a beard. The Revolution presented him with a different possibility for his country. He
said:
“After Febuary 11, I felt that this country is mine... we went out to clean the streets
and we were very happy... I felt that this land over which I was walking was mine, I
was walking in my country. Everybody was happy and the whole world believed that
we achieved something.”

Noha had a romantic vision of how the concept of el balad changed after and because of the
Revolution. She said:
“After being a territory that you live in, the country became a homeland (watan) that
lives within you... the 18 days made me feel how much I love this country, made me
feel empathy towards the poor people, made me feel how much you want to clean14
this country. It is a matter of life or death... I became active in it and I want it to be
better than any other country... [by] achieving social justice and giving it back its
dignity on the international level (arraga’ karametha barra)... [I started to feel that] I
am an effective member of society, and that I have an opinion... my presence in the
street [through protesting] will have an impact on society, my presence in [things
such as]... awareness campaigns...[will have an impact].”
14

Tennaddafi derives from tandeef, which literally means to clean. Noha uses it here figuratively.
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Essam felt a sense of alienation while living in Egypt. He said:
“Before the Revolution... the state was not our state, it was not the state of the
people... el balad was run by the police, the military and the intelligence. Everything
was run by those who are in control of the country and by businessmen... so before
the Revolution, there was always this feeling that the country is not ours... after the
ouster [of Mubarak], people started saying that we will work and we could build...
[this] gave me hope that there could be real economic revival in Egypt that would
really benefit the people.”

I asked him how he felt--on a personal level--that the country was reclaimed. He replied:
“I felt that I could speak freely, therefore, my struggle will be worthwhile, it will be
worthwhile to support [a workers’] strike, and I would then feel that I did
something... I would feel that there is a need for me in this country.”

Mona said the following:
“Before [the Revolution], I really felt as a stranger in this country... the simplest
[proof] is the way you are being treated by government bureaucrats. You always feel
like a third-class citizen... there was an alliance between people in power, Mubarak’s
people, and people who had money... they were robbing the country,”

But after the Revolution, that changed. She said:
“I felt I have a responsibility [towards the country] more than before...a
responsibility to work towards what I see is right... [for example], I saw that I should
urge people to participate in the referendum15... so I rode on the metro and spoke out
in a loud voice telling people ‘I am reminding you that the Referendum will take
place after eight days’ [she laughs], so I started to do things of that kind. I never in
my life thought that I could do such things... I carried this attitude that [this country]
is ours, by the way, this country is ours.”

She tapped on the table twice as she repeated the last sentence. When I asked her for clarification,
she added:
“It meant that I have a say and the street is ours, I will walk on the street and say
what I want... After February 11, everyone was happy it was as if we reclaimed
public space, all of this was ours as if we reclaimed the country (el balad reg’et lena
tani) and that now we could do something... about all the negative things we see.”
15

She was referring to the referendum on constitutional amendments in March, 2011.
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Thus, the participants’ narratives about el balad oscillated between the reality of oppressive
practices by the state that constrained their freedom and stripped them of their dignity on the one
hand, and on the other, the utopia that they saw in Tahrir and wanted to see in real life. El balad
embodied their affect and their desire for a more just society. The meaning of el balad was shaped
by what they saw as wrong in Egypt in the past, or more precisely before January 25, and what they
hoped the Revolution would achieve in terms of change or improvement in the situation of the
country. El balad is an ethos and a set of values that was lacking in the participants’ encounters
with the state and which they hoped would be embodied in the new Egypt after the Revolution. This
ethos and these values expressed in participants narratives included: solidarity, bravery, social
justice, and dignity. The concept of el balad was central in their narratives and it was key in shaping
their shared consciousness and their shared subjectivity in the context of Tahrir Square and the
Revolution. This entailed a feeling of renewed ownership of their country as territory and resources,
as well as politically--that now they would be able to have a say--, and feeling of identification with
other members of that collective around them, i.e. the other Egyptians like themselves, their
compatriots.
II-For the Love of El Balad
There is an ongoing debate about “love of Egypt,” how it was utilized during the 18 days
and how it continues until this day to shape political debates through statements such as “ashan
maslahet masr” (for the interest of Egypt) or “ashaan el balad” (for the sake of the country).
Politicians and the ruling authorities, including military council members, use statements such as “I
am doing this for the sake of Egypt” to justify some laws or measures, and counter-Revolution
forces also employ the same rhetoric in a bid to gain legitimacy. The protesters themselves,
including participants in this research, also often used a patriotic discourse with reference to el
balad. As much as all of these statements could very well be emanating from sincere feelings of
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love for the country, what is interesting is how such rhetoric is employed either for political gains or
for gaining the sympathy of or emotionally affecting the Egyptian public.
Although the January 25 Revolution was not staged against a foreign occupier as in the
revolutions of 1919 and 1952 against the British, I argue that protesters’ participation was partly
shaped by at least one aspect of patriotism, that is the love for their country or el balad. The enemy
in this case was Mubarak and his regime, and they were all Egyptian, just like the protesters
demonstrating against them. Yet to discredit them, the protesters used metaphors of loyalty and
betrayal, accusing the regime of being traitors working against the interests of the country and the
people on the one hand, and on the other hand, describing Mubarak opponents as being patriotic or
shakseyaat wataniya (patriotic personalities). The protesters oftentimes told me in conversations
“they (former regime officials) sold the country” (ba’ou el balad) and shouted the slogan
“Mubarak, you Traitor! You sold our gas to Israel!” (ya mubarak ya ‘ameel! be’t ghazna le
isra’eel). Similarly, the state also used nationalistic rhetoric, among other means, to discredit and
delegitimize the demonstrators, accusing them of being spies and affiliated with Hezbollah, Iran,
Hamas, the U.S. and Israel. They were blamed for causing panic and fear among the citizens and for
causing an economic slowdown by their mere presence in Tahrir Square and other areas of protest.
This is similar to how the Egyptian state uses nationalistic rhetoric to delegitimize NGOs (Abdel
Rahman, 2004).
The singular “Egyptian” or el masry emerged as a superior being and pride permeated the
chants of the protesters, such as “Rise your head up high! You are Egyptian!” From the very first
day of the Revolution, a symbol that is very strongly associated with patriotism appeared: The flag.
The calls for the demonstrations included a request for the participants not to hold any banners
indicating their affiliation, whether political or otherwise, and to carry only the Egyptian flag.
The participants in this research noticed the outburst of patriotic manifestations around
them, with all of them citing the flag and the nationalistic songs as displays thereof. Some
articulated their participation in the protests and their relationship to el balad in patriotic terms,
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using the language of “love for the country” to either describe either why they joined the protests in
the first place or characterize their participation in them. In our conversations, the participants
echoed such debates, whether by professing patriotic sentiments or by rejecting regime accusations
that the protesters were being unpatriotic and were serving the interests of foreign governments.
Mona recalled one of the days when she was in the square, some people started shouting that the
government was accusing the protesters of Tahrir of being spies. At the mention of this, the crowds
started singing the national anthem. Mona said she felt awkward because she does not identify with
the idea of taking pride in being Egyptian. However, she did feel happy that the Egyptian people, of
whom she is part, were able to achieve something good, such as the toppling of Mubarak. Noha
identified with displays of patriotism that I described above, acknowledging feelings of “love”
towards Egypt. She said the first time she realized she loves this country was when she saw the
flags in Tahrir square. She eventually changed her desire to live abroad. She said:
“I never thought I love this country that much. I never thought I would love it more
than my mother and my daughter. I never thought that in my life... I want this
country to be the best country in the world. Instead of leaving it... why not live in it
and improve it for my daughter... it’s the first time that I feel if I stayed here for 100
years and it has still not improved, I would still not leave it… [When I think of el
balad] I don’t see the streets or the Nile or the pyramids or history or civilization or
any of that. [El balad] is a condition that lives inside of me.”

Albert, on the other hand, said his feelings for the country have not changed at all because of the
Revolution and that for him, nationalism was tantamount to racism. However, he did feel a sense of
belonging to the Egyptian society and people, because it is among them that he has always lived.
This shows that there was some form of reconstituted relationship if not with Egypt as a nation then
with the idea of Egypt as a collective of people. The words of the participants show that they did
not necessarily think of Egypt as a nation, i.e. homogenous and tied to a state as is theorized about
in the classical theories of the nation, but they had a new conception of Egypt as an entity. This
conception was shaped by the historical moment of the Revolution and no longer obeys the old
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categories. In that sense, “nation” does not convey what these narrators mean when they refer to
Egypt el balad.
The fact participants felt they now had a stake in their country and were agents of change
and “authors of politics” contributed to the birth of such feelings of reconnection with and, in some
cases, love for the country. At the same time, they were challenging the regime’s monopoly on
“love for Egypt” that was used to quiet any voices of dissent. It was a rejection of the chauvinistic
nationalism devised and promoted by the state, such as in football matches, the most salient
example of which was when Egypt was playing Algeria in the Africa Cup of Nations in 2009/2010.
Instead, it was a display of a patriotism that was shaped by the exceptional historical and political
moment of the Revolution and the realization that Egyptians could do something exceptional and
are thus worthy of having pride at belonging to their country and their fellow patriots. I distinguish
this form of patriotism from nationalism in that the the latter emphasizes the supremacy of the
“nation” and its members against an “other,” while the former does not necessarily do that.
Nationalism also has negative connotations, such as exclusion and racism, and that is why it is
rejected by many, including Albert. Albert did acknowledge some sort of love or appreciation,
which was not directed towards the abstract entity of the nation or the homeland, but rather towards
his compatriots.
III- The Emergence of the “Active” Political Subject
As illustrated in the previous chapters, all the participants in this research have to varying
degrees attested to becoming more “active”--with all using somehow similar terms to describe such
a change--and engaging in a “new” role in their society as a result of their participation in the 18
days. The participants used different phrases to describe what happened to them, such as: “the
birth of hope,” “abandoning apathy,” “breaking the barrier of fear,” “the return of dignity,” and
“pride in being Egyptian.” They all expressed a sense of empowerment after being able to “topple
the regime”, and this empowerment has driven them to continue to remain engaged in effecting
change. How can we understand this subjectivity that was shaped by participation in the
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Revolution, by the new conception of el balad, and partly by patriotic sentiments or “love for the
country”? This “active political subject” emerged through a process that entailed certain practices as
well as a degree of reflexivity. It is true that a rupture did occur at particular moments within the 18
days, like for example the first time a participant joined a protest and the first time he or she joined
a political party. But this subjectivity--that of the “active” member or subject of Revolution--was
shaped more by the overarching process within which these moments of rupture occurred. This
process involved participants’ marching in rallies, chanting slogans, sleeping in the Square,
mingling and chitchatting with other protesters, engaging in post-Mubarak election campaigning
and political and social awareness campaigns, voting, and so on. Their subjectivity was being
formed by all of these actions and practices. This subjectivity is also shaped by their past encounters
with the government, as Ismail argued (Ismail 2011). The individual self or subject that took part in
the collectivity that protested against the regime was shaped by his or her experiences of interacting
with the government that was full of humiliation, especially vis-a-via the police. These experience
were not individual, but there was intersubjective understanding of it that gave rise to collective
feelings of anger towards the regime that mobilized the individuals to act collectively, argued Ismail
(Ismail, 2011, 990). “Through critical reflexivity on encounters with government, a self, formed
against government ... crystallized as part of a collective (Ismail, 2012, 991). Here Ismail makes
reference to the idea of reflexivity, which was also raised by Ortner in her discussion on the
formation of subjectivity (Ortner 2006).
The participants in this research reflected on their role, and they all agreed that “odow fa’el”
(an “active member” of the country/community/society) describes how they see themselves and
their role in Egypt in the wake of the Revolution (one of the participants came up with that term
when I asked him how he saw his role changing as a result of the Revolution and taking part in it,
and then I suggested it to the rest, all of whom agreed that that description applied to them). “Odow
fa’el” was constituted around participants’ belief that they “reclaimed their country” and that they
were an important to it, and this made them engage in collective social and political action. As Mo
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described it: “It became your country, you feel that you became fa’el (active) in it.” Mo said that he
wanted to help bring corruption cases out to the light (it was not clear how he will do that). This
new perception of himself as fa’el meant that he will be more involved in political and social
change campaigns, such as being part of the Khaled Ali presidential campaign. This shows that he
felt it was worth becoming “active” and engaging in political and social action once he felt he had a
stake in his country.
This subjectivity was tied to a new sense of hope and optimism that was born straight out of
the 18 days. Essam spoke about what “we,” the Egyptians, did during the 18 days and his new
perception of himself as being “important” for the country. “We felt we have done something...
people started to feel that they could do something real for their country by themselves,” he said.
Essam’s participation in the Revolution and the fact that the Revolution did succeed--even if partly
-- was what made him feel that he is important to this country and that he “could really do
something for this country.” The immediate concrete manifestation of this “something” that Essam
did for the country was the formation of his university’s first leftist student group. It is this sense of
hope that Noha also highlighted. She said that she had thought about quitting taking part in
demonstrations several times, but the hope that was born in the 18 days and the determination and
the belief in the importance of her role were keeping her going and engaged despite of all the
disappointments. It is precisely her participation in the 18 days that maintains her desire to remain
involved in whatever she was doing for the country, such as going to protests and being involved in
awareness campaigns.
This “active political subject” was therefore shaped by a sense of belonging to their country
and reclaiming it, which triggered hope and optimism. This subjectivity was essentially political in
in that the January 25 Revolution was a “contentious situation” from which its participants emerged
as “political subjects”. “The political subject emerges not through discourses, or the ideological
thought of a great philosopher, or even by some sacred text called the Constitution, but as a result of
certain conjuncture of conflicting circumstances” (Samaddar, 2009, viii-xix). This concept of the
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“political subject,” as Samaddar argued, describes what other categories, such as “citizen” and
“political society,” fall short of explaining, because as I have shown throughout this thesis that the
subjects were excluded as youth--sometimes even by their own free will--from formal politics and
institutional politics. So they were engaging in politics through practices related to the Revolution,
even if they themselves shied away from calling what they were doing “politics,” such as the case
of Noha who preferred to label her involvement as “revolutionary work” and not “politics.” So
there was still distrust of “formal” and institutional politics among these subjects of the Revolution.
However, by the mere engagement in that kind of “revolutionary work,” they were indeed
transforming the realm politics in that their voices now count in government decision making at
least in some instances. What someone like Noha sees as “revolutionary work” and “not politics,”
such as rallies and campaigns, could very well have an impact on the political process that could
possibly be as significant as parliamentary elections, i.e. institutional politics.
The previous discussion showed how subjects perceived their participation and the outcome
of such participation in terms of reshaping of the relationship with their country and of the
emergence of their subjectivity as “active members.” There was a discrepancy between the reality
of the country--lack of rights under the state, etc.--on the one hand and how participants would like
to see their country on the other. It is thanks to this gap between the two, between the reality and the
aspiration, that to a large extent many participants went out to the streets to demonstrate and why
many of them will continue to remain “active” participants in their country (to improve it). The
“active political subject” was born out of a desire to change the reality of the country, their practices
toward that end, and a belief that they were authoring their own politics and history.
IV- Conclusion
This chapter tried to explain what happened to the relationship between the participants and
the collective of Egypt. The relationship between Egyptians and el balad was reconfigured as a
result of and after taking part in the myriad aspects of the Revolution, such as engagement in
protest, interactions and dialogues in the Square with other protesters, post-Mubarak electioneering
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and voting. This reconfiguration manifested itself on several levels. For some, such participation
heightened patriotic sentiments they harbor towards their country and increased their sense of
belonging to the collective. In a way, they were authoring a new way of belonging, of engaging in
the affairs of their country, and of expressing their love for it. It was these new practices they
engaged in that defined this reformulated relationship with el balad. In sum, this reformulated
relationship was concretized through these real-life practices related to the Revolution and the postRevolution period.
Through these practices of protesting and voting that showed participants a different side of
their country, a new conception of el balad was born, one that is an extension of the Utopia lived in
Tahrir Square. In their narratives, protesters articulated a different vision of how they wanted their
country to be--a vision that is not dictated by their unjust rulers and the failed state under which
they were living. In so doing, they were rejecting the everyday techniques of humiliation and
oppression that were imposed on them by the state and its agents. El balad for them represented an
ethos, a spirit that was constantly being violated by the oppressive state and its agents but that was
reincarnated in a different form in Tahrir. Only through engaging in political and social collective
action by performing those new practices of the Revolution will they keep this spirit alive. This
process, which included all of these practices and involved reflexivity gave rise to a new
subjectivity of being odw fael, or an “active political subject”. That reconfigured subjectivity is
reflected in their desire and willingness to remain engaged in changing their country for the better.
Chapter Six
Conclusion
In this study, I contributed theoretically and methodologically to the production of histories
about the series of events identified as the January 25 Revolution and to the exploration of political
subjectivities emerging out of such contentious situations. I documented the narratives of a group of
middle-class youth whose first experience of protest was during the 18 days of demonstrations and
the sit-in in Tahrir Square and who joined the Revolution not as part of any organized group or
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political party but as individuals. I attempted to explain how and why such youth were mobilized
into joining collective action for the first time in their lives, how they narrated such historical
events, and what does this narration and participation mean in terms of shaping their subjectivities.
I followed an approach that focuses on “politics from below” that examines the grassroots
levels rather than “elite politics” of rulers and governments in an attempt to present the perspective
of the subject, i.e. the protesters, without however ignoring the historical, social, economic, and
political structure within which these subjects act. I argued that it is not only through the
participation in the events of the Revolution that political subjectivities are shaped but also through
its very narration and production as an historical event. By such narration of events as a shared
experience, participants were constructing themselves as members of a collective of protesters or
revolutionaries and were reconstituting their relationship to the collective of Egypt and to their
Egyptians.
The narratives of the protesters were constructed through the remembering of certain details
and the forgetting of others, at times intentional and at other times not. The main three themes about
the 18 days that recurred in the participants’ narratives were: the novelty of the event, how peaceful
or not the protests were, and what level of co-existence existed within the Tahrir Square
community. All the participants acknowledged in one way or another the novelty and the
unexpected and unplanned nature of the protests. This was central to their making as subjects of
protest in that their participation in the 18 days marked a rupture with the past and the beginning of
something new that was to continue thereafter. They were witnessing and engaging in the creation
of new emerging meanings that are not scripted or predesigned but that were being born out of
practices. In narrating their collective past, the participants were also constructing themselves as
belonging to a shared collective of revolutionaries.
I explored the multiple demands raised by the protest participants throughout the 18 days
and the myriad ways through which protesters engaged in the protest sites of Tahrir Square as well
as other sites that contributed to the Revolution, such as the residential neighborhoods and places of
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work and study, and on social media. I argued that these middle-class youth protesters felt at risk
under the neoliberal repressive regime of Mubarak and were motivated to join collective action by
citizenship entitlements and by the realization that socio-economic rights were interrelated to and
inseparable political and civil rights. In protest sites, the participants engaged in tasks and leisure
activities that emerged at the spur of the moment as they responded to the exigencies of the
situation whether during the demonstrations or the two-week long sit-in in Tahrir Square. For
example, some fought with security forces and secured the Square with barricades and logs, while
others took charge of bringing in food and other supplies to the protesters camping out. Tahrir
Square and other protest sites during the 18 days gained re-signified meanings--ranging from a
battlefield to a carnival. These activities and practices were transforming not only Tahrir Square as
a public space but also the participants’ subjectivities as “revolutionaries,” or as subjects of
Revolution, and as members of a larger collective of protesters.
I also looked at how participants described and made sense of the change they have
witnessed as a result of participating in the Revolution. I argued that their participation in the 18
days triggered within them a new political consciousness and gave them a reason and a cause to get
involved in social and political actions. They all became regular participants of protests, with some
joining a political party or a group, while others remaining independent actors. Some of them
changed their views about the effectiveness of voting and went to the polls in the elections that took
place in the year and a half after the ouster of Mubarak. Others started to reflect on their political
ideology and embraced new political ideas. Overall, their modes of engagement with politics
changed as a result, and in the process, they were starting to change the very meaning and practice
of the the political and politics.
Furthermore, I explored the concept of el balad, or the country, which recurred in the
narratives of the participants. The concept of el balad was central in their narratives and it was key
in shaping their shared consciousness and their shared subjectivity in the context of Tahrir Square
and the Revolution. The Revolution and its partial success--at least in toppling Mubarak--gave
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those who participated in it a sense of reclaiming their country. I argued that participants’
relationship to the collective of Egypt was reconstituted as a result of their experiences of partaking
in the 18 days, whether as a result of the act of protest itself or other situations they encountered
during the Revolution. This reformulated relationship is the outcome of and is translated into new
practices the participants engaged in, such as voting and joining political parties and other kinds of
political and social action groups. It was against this reconfigured relationship with el balad that the
subject of Revolution became also an “active political subject” in his or her society, and this
subjectivity is bound to continue to evolve with the change in the historical, political and social
contexts.
Therefore, that the Egyptian Revolution consisted of a series of historical junctures--the
outbreak of protests on January 25, Egyptians joining protests, inhaling tear gas, going to the polls,
or joining a political party for the first time in their lives, etc.--, should not make us overlook its
processual nature. Throughout this process of transformation, the social world is being re-ordered
and certain social and political categories and practices are gaining re-signified meanings. The
significance of the words “citizen,” “youth,” “politics,” and the “collective”--to cite a few
examples--has changed as practices such as assembling, protesting, striking, voting and
electioneering have become somehow normalized and more integrated into the everyday lives of
Egyptians as part of that process of change. A growing segment of Egyptians are engaging more
and more in what was before thought of as “seyassa,” or politics, and are getting involved in
domains that were previously monopolized by a smaller group of the population. This thesis is an
attempt to contribute to making sense of that change and to track that process of emergence.
As I am writing this, the process of the Revolution is already entering a new stage. The first
post-Revolution constitution was approved by almost 64 percent of the population in a referendum
in December 2012. The period preceding the vote witnessed unrest as country-wide demonstrations
were organized to protest the then proposed charter, which was seen as unrepresentative of the
Egyptian population, and dozens were killed or wounded in clashes between regime supporters and
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opposition protesters. “Nothing has changed” was the lament voiced by many people disenchanted
at what the media called “national discord,” whereby the so-called “Islamists” and “secularists” are
pitted against each other. It seems to these people that we are today witnessing the same cycle of
events since the onset of the Revolution two years ago--the eruption of demonstrations, attacks by
riot police, unrepresentative elections etc.--, with similar protagonists--alienated youth and
protesters, fallen martyrs, a brutal police force, and rulers and politicians disconnected from their
people. The same uncertain state that was felt two years ago still lingers and the same questions that
were raised back then are still left unanswered. Yet if we attempt to analyze the situation and
answer those same questions now, they are certain to yield new meanings.
What is this Revolution about? How will this process evolve? How will the Revolution
participants and the millions of others who took to the streets during the 18 days continue to be
engaged in politics? How will they narrate these events in the future? How will their stories be
different? How will their future narratives reflect the changing topography of Egyptian politics and
power relations? How and when will the Revolution succeed? What constitutes the success of the
Revolution? All of these questions will continue to be asked and every time the answer may be
different as the attempt to answer them will always be part of the historical and political context in
which they are asked. The Revolution, thus, is an historical event that is constantly in flux and that
is being continuously remolded by the very social actors engaged in it as well as the larger political
and social formations encompassing it. Change in this context could not be understood solely in
terms of rupture nor could it be fully grasped in its totality. This thesis was an attempt to engage
such change not as a moment of rupture but rather as a range of moments that are part of an
ongoing process of emergence.
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